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1CHAPTER 1. A KUHN-TUCKER MODEL OF MICRO-LEVEL
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND: TEMPORAL STABILITY OF
RECREATION PREFERENCES USING PANEL DATA
1.1 Introduction
Recreation demand models are one of the primary tools of trade for environmen-
tal economists seeking to estimate welfare changes from improved environmental quality.
These estimates are used in benefit-cost analysis and evaluation of policy that affects en-
vironmental amenities. Recreational usage provides one way to measure the use value of
environmental amenities and thus allows us to capture welfare changes through changes
in usage when the quality of an environmental amenity changes. The data collected for
analysis in these models is among the most detailed microeconomic data available for de-
mand estimation. Thus these data make an ideal laboratory for testing and evaluating
state of the art economic demand systems. Particularly challenging econometric aspects
of these micro-level household data include the fact that there are many recreation sites
to choose from, a large percentage of households take no trips at all, and a small propor-
tion of households make multiple trips, generally to a small subset of sites available. The
choice behavior underlying these data consists of both discrete and continuous components
- whether to make a trip or not and if taking a trip, which sites to visit and how many
trips to take to the chosen sites. The techniques developed to estimate recreation demand
2models can be used to estimate demand for any micro-level household data.
Common recreation demand models are random utility maximization (RUM) models
(Yen et al., 1994; Herriges et al., 1997), count data models (Egan et al., 2006; Herriges et
al., 2008) and Kuhn-Tucker models (Phaneuf et al., 2000; Von Haefen et al, 2004). Each
of these addresses a specific subset of characteristics of the data. This paper focuses on
Kuhn-Tucker models.
The Kuhn-Tucker models are utility-theoretic and the estimating equations for them
are derived directly from the underlying optimization problem. Further, these models can
address all but one of the typical characteristics of recreation demand data, viz., their count
nature. However, the Kuhn-Tucker models are highly non-linear and the presence of cor-
ners, the situation where a consumer does not consume one or more goods available, makes
them analytically challenging. Phaneuf et al. (2000) presented one of the first estimates
of the Kuhn-Tucker model in conjunction with welfare estimates for hypothetical changes
in site quality and prices. von Haefen et al. (2004) extended that work by developing an
algorithm for estimating a Kuhn-Tucker model when the choice set is large, i.e. when there
are a very large number of possible combinations of recreation sites to visit and, therefore,
“corners” that each individual can choose among.
While significant strides have been made in accurate econometric estimation of Kuhn-
Tucker models of recreation demand, the application of these models is still rare. For
instance, very little is known about the temporal stability of parameter estimates and
associated welfare estimates of environmental quality improvements. Typical studies collect
a year of data, fit demand equations and use them to estimate welfare measures for policy
relevant changes in environment quality. But what if parameter estimates are not stable
over time? Is it possible to use welfare estimates from a single year of data to characterize
welfare changes for all future years? Or do parameters vary largely from year to year,
3necessitating the use of multiple years of data to accurately pin down preferences for
environmental quality changes? These are questions that have not been asked in the
literature before. This paper addresses these questions using a four-year panel dataset
with information on trips taken by households in Iowa to 127 major lakes. The availability
of such a dataset enables us to ask and answer these questions since we can observe how
demand for recreational trips have changed with changes in site quality attributes over the
four years.
This paper estimates a Kuhn-Tucker model with a large choice set using a four-year
panel dataset for close to 1300 households. This is the first such estimation in the literature,
and only the second estimation of corner solutions with panel data. Chakir et al.(2004)
estimated a model with corner solutions for four possible choices and two years of data.
However, that model is not utility theoretic as the Kuhn-Tucker model since it arbitrarily
posits a demand function and adds an error term to it. We present estimates with four
years of data and a choice set consisting of 127 sites.
There have been very few panel data studies in the recreation demand literature. Those
that use panel methods (Englin and Cameron, 1996; Egan and Herriges, 2006) combine
revealed preference and stated preference data from individuals at the same point of time,
but do not have multi-year data. In addition there are no prior studies that combine
the triad of a Kuhn Tucker model, a large choice set and a panel dataset. This research
fills that gap. Specifically, the contribution of this paper lies in presenting a method to
incorporate correlations in preferences over time within the Kuhn-Tucker model for a large
choice set and using that method to examine whether preferences of households for outdoor
recreation are stable over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the precursors
of the Kuhn-Tucker models and discusses the place and the importance of this approach
4in the context of recreation demand models; sets up the model; describes the likelihood
functions for different assumptions about the distributions of the regression error term;
and presents the method for estimating the model with correlation across time. Section
3 describes the data and examines the stability of reported trips across different years.
Section 4 presents the estimation results and the final section concludes.
1.2 The Kuhn-Tucker Approach and Model Specification
The Kuhn-Tucker model is the latest in a line of approaches that model the downward
censored nature of recreation demand data, i.e the fact that trip demand cannot be neg-
ative. It is a development from the Amemiya-Tobin approach (Amemiya, 1974; Tobin,
1958). The Kuhn-Tucker formulation improves on the previous approaches in that it is
utility consistent while the earlier approaches are not. Utility consistency implies that the
decision to undertake a trip and the site choice decision are both derived from the same
underlying utility function. However, until recently these models were not extensively used
because of their analytical intractability. Recent advances in computational resources have
made it much easier to estimate these models.
Phaneuf et al. (2000) used the Kuhn Tucker model to estimate demand for fishing in
the Wisconsin Great Lakes region and offered a method for estimating the expected welfare
effects proxied by compensating variation associated with hypothetical policy changes in
the Great Lakes region. The welfare estimation process involved computing the demands
at every possible corner of the budget-constrained choice space and choosing the one that
maximized utility. With the choice set consisting of four different sites, for each individual
there were 16 (24) different corners at which demands had to be estimated. This was
computationally tractable. However, this method becomes unwieldy for large choice sets
which are typical for many kinds of recreational choices. Von Haefen et al. (2004) offered
5a method for estimating changes in welfare systems for large demand systems. All of these
studies worked with data for a single time period.
We extend the Phaneuf et al. (2000) and the von Haefen et al. (2004) work by
accounting for the correlation in household preferences over time and implement it using
a panel dataset for trips to 127 lakes in Iowa. This also enables us to look at the stability
of the parameter estimates from the Kuhn-Tucker model over time.
For the model we assume that there are T periods and a total of M sites each having
K characteristics. The utility function for a household i in period t is given by
Uit =
M∑
j=1
exp(δ′Sit + ηijt)ln[exp(γ′qit)xijt + θ] + ln(zit), (1.1)
where
xijt = Number of trips taken by the ith individual to site j in period t,
Qt = [q1t, q2t...qMt], where qjt is a K by 1 vector of quality variables associated with site j,
Sit = the set of demographic characteristics for the ith household in period t
θ = parameter allowing for corner solutions,
ηi = an MT by 1 matrix of error terms for the ith individual,
Pijt = the ith individual’s cost of visiting site j in period t,
zit = a composite of all other goods (the numeraire and a necessary good),
γ and δ = parameters of the model.
ηijt represents heterogeneity in preferences consisting of factors that are assumed known
to the individual but unobserved by the researcher. Associating the error term with prefer-
ences rather than with the demand makes this model consistent with McFadden’s random
utility maximization framework. This specification of the utility function is additively sep-
arable. Further, it assumes that every good (site in this case) is a normal good and all
goods are Hicksian substitutes. The utility function also assumes weak complementarity,
6meaning that quality attributes of a site do not affect the total utility of the individual if
the site is not visited (Maler, 1974). In other words, the individual cares about the quality
attributes of only those sites that s/he visits. The budget constraint for the individual in
period t is
Yit =
M∑
j=1
Pijtxijt + zit;xijt ≥ 0; zit > 0∀i, j, t. (1.2)
The decision variables for individual i are xijt and zit. The number of trips to any lake
must be non-negative while the expenditure on the numeraire must be strictly positive.
The Kuhn-Tucker first order condition for the ith individual, in period t with respect to
the jth site is given by
∂Uit
∂xijt
= exp(δ′Sit + ηijt)
γ′qit)
[exp(γ′qit)xijt + θ]
≤ Pijt
zit
, (1.3)
with a complementarity slackness condition which requires that
xijt(exp(δ′Sit + ηijt)
γ′qit)
[exp(γ′qit)xijt + θ]
− Pijt
zit
) = 0 (1.4)
This in turn implies that
ηijt ≤ ln(Pijt
zit
) + ln[xijt +
θ
exp(γ′qit)
]− δ′Sit = g(xit, Pt, zit, Sit, qjt;β), (1.5)
where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. For each individual i in each period
t, there are M such equations - one for each site. These equations together with the
assumed distribution of the error term define a likelihood function which can then be used
to estimate the parameters and welfare changes from hypothetical changes in site quality
attributes.
The error term for each individual and for each site are allowed to be correlated across
time. The error term for the ith individual and jth site in period t consists of two com-
ponents - one that is unique to the individual, the site and the time period - a purely
7stochastic term - and another which is unique to the individual but remains constant over
time. The second component is the one that induces correlation in preferences across time.
This component could be further broken down into two components - one that is constant
across time and sites and another that is constant across time but different for each site. All
three components of the error term are random. Errors are uncorrelated across individuals.
Formally, this can be written as:
ηijt = ui + τij + εijt
ui, τij and εijt are all drawn from different distributions with zero location parameters
and scale parameters given by σ2u, σ
2
τ , and σ
2
ε , respectively. They are all uncorrelated
with each other and across individuals. This specification of the error term nests two
sub-specifications given by
ηijt = ui + εijt
ηijt = τij + εijt
ui indicates correlation across time and sites. When the correlation across time is constant
across sites as well, it indicates that individuals who are more likely to take trips to one site
are also more likely to take trips to other sites. It would capture the fact that some people
are avid trip takers, boat owners or fishers and others are not into outdoor recreation -
factors that are invariant across sites for a given individual. τij indicates correlation across
time but not across sites. A correlation term like this captures the fact that people like
some sites more than others and visit the same sites over and over again.
For the present paper, we assume that εijt, ui and τij are all drawn from different
normal distributions.
The first order conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker model together with the complementarity
8slackness conditions require that
ηijt = g(xit, Pt, zit, Sit, qjt;β) = gijt if xijt > 0 and
ηijt ≤ g(xit, Pt, zit, Sit, qjt;β) = gijt if xijt = 0.
Let us assume that the ith consumer makes no trips to the first n sites and a positive
number of trips to the rest. Further let [Pt, zit, Sit, qjt] = Rit. Then the likelihood function
for individual i in period t is given by
Lit | β =
∫ g(xi1t;Rit;β)
−∞
...
∫ g(xint;Rit;β)
−∞
f(ηi1t, ..., ηint, gi(n+1)t, ...giMt) | J | dηi1t...dηint (1.6)
where | J | is the Jacobian determinant for the transformation of the error term, f(ηit)
is the assumed probability density function of the error and F (ηit) is the corresponding
distribution function. If preferences are not correlated over time so that the error term has
only one component i.e ηijt = εijt then we can use this likelihood function to compute the
likelihood function for the entire sample.
However, we have data for more than one period, and we need to take into account the
term that for each individual induces correlation across time periods. There are two ways
that we can incorporate the correlation in our estimation process. If the correlation term
is given by ui, the first order condition can be written as
ui + εijt = g(xit, Rit;β) if xijt > 0, and
ui + εijt ≤ g(xit, Rit;β) if xijt = 0.
9These, in turn imply
εijt = g(xit, Rit;β)− ui if xijt > 0
εijt ≤ g(xit, Rit;β)− ui if xijt = 0
Taking into account this correlation term, the likelihood function in equation (5) is con-
ditional on a given draw of ui. Further, an individual’s likelihood function must include
the contributions for each year of the panel. Conditional on a given draw of the correla-
tion term ui, the likelihood functions for an individual in different years are independent.
Hence, the conditional likelihood function for individual i is given by the product of his/her
conditional likelihood functions in each year.
Li | β;ui =
T∏
t=1
(Lit | β;ui). (1.7)
The expected value of the likelihood for individual i is given by
E(Li | β) =
∫ ∞
−∞
T∏
t=1
(Lit | β, ui)fu(ui)dui. (1.8)
The estimation process will involve the following steps. First we define the likelihood
function for each individual in each period, conditional on a draw of the correlation term
ui. The conditional likelihood functions for that individual for each year are multiplied to
get the conditional likelihood function for that individual for a given draw of ui. Integrating
this over the range of ui gives us the expected likelihood function for that individual. This
integration will have to be done numerically since the functional form of this likelihood
function is not analytically tractable. If the correlation term is given by τij , individual i’s
conditional likelihood function is given by
Li | β; τij =
T∏
t=1
(Lit | β; τi,j). (1.9)
10
so that her likelihood function is given by
E(Li | β) =
∫ ∞
−∞
...
∫ ∞
−∞
T∏
t=1
(Lit | β, τi)fτ (τi)dτi1...dτiM . (1.10)
Using the maximum likelihood approach we can estimate the distribution parameters
of the term that induces correlations in preferences and test if these parameters are signifi-
cantly different from zero. An alternate approach is to model the correlation in preferences
through a method of bootstrapping. To implement the bootstrapping method, we take a
set of random draws with replacement from the sample of households and estimate the
model for for each of the four years separately for the same set of individuals. Each time
we take 1280 draws with replacement from our sample of 1280 and repeat the process 1000
times. Since the single year estimates use data for the exact same individuals for each of
the four years, the correlation in preferences is absorbed into the other parameters of the
model and we do not use a separate parameter for correlation. Using a large number of
repeated draws (1000) we can establish the 95% confidence intervals for the parameter and
welfare estimates and also test the differences in these estimates across the years.
In the bootstrap method we do not estimate a parameter relating to the correlation
term. Neither do we need to make any assumptions about the nature of the correlation,
unlike the error components approach, which induces a specific for of correlation. If the
model with the error components is correctly specified, then the bootstrap method will be
less efficient in terms of the parameter estimates. However, it will be much more flexible
both in terms of the number of parameters and in terms of the form of the correlation.
1.3 Data
For four consecutive years from 2002 to 2005, a survey questionnaire about trips to
lakes in Iowa was sent out to a random sample of households within the state. Each
11
year about 4000 completed surveys were returned. Of the returned surveys, information
on some individuals could not be used because the surveys were incomplete. Excluding
those individuals for whom complete information on trips taken was not available, we have
about 3500 completed surveys in each year except in 2003 for which we have about 4500
surveys. The sample was expanded in 2003 with surveys being sent out to an additional
sample of households who did not receive the survey in 2002. There was an attrition from
the balanced panel as households dropped out over the years. Some returned surveys did
not have complete trip information and were dropped from the dataset. Further, some
households claimed to have made over hundred trips. They were typically households who
lived on or close to a lake and drove by the lake everyday as they went by their daily
activities. Our purpose is to model recreational visit to lakes and hence these households
were dropped from the dataset. A balanced four-year panel with complete trip information
is available for 1621 observations.
One of the first questions in the survey asked respondents if they had visited any lakes
in Iowa in the previous year. The purpose of this paper is to model single-day trips taken
to lakes for recreational purposes. To that end, the data for visits include only day trips
and not overnight trips. Table 1 presents a year-wise summary of the returns received,
the number and percentage of respondents indicating that they did not visit any lake in
Iowa during that year (columns 3 and 4 titled “Novisits”) and the average number of lakes
visited by all individuals (column 5). The fourth column in table 1 indicates that 33-35%
of respondents in 2003, 2004 and 2005 did not visit any lake in Iowa. 41% of respondents
in 2002 did not visit any lakes. The average number of lakes visited by all respondents
ranged between 1.8 and 2.5. The table also presents this information for a two-year
panel, a three-year panel and the full four-year panel. All three panels are for consecutive
years. Comparing the single year statistics with the panels we can see that the sample size
12
decreases as the years in the panel increase. This reflects the fact that people tend to drop
out of the sample over the years.
Comparing across the different panels in Table 1 we find that the percentage of re-
spondents who did not visit any lakes in any year decreases in 2002 and 2003 but not for
2004 and 2005, compared with the single year data as the number of years in the panel
increases. This indicates that people who make trips to lakes i.e. lake users are not any
more likely than non-users to continue responding to the survey over the years. The av-
erage number of lakes visited by each individual is also similar for the four-year panel as
compared with the single year averages. This indicates that the four year balanced panel
is fairly representative of the larger dataset. An anomalous finding is that the maximum
number of lakes visited is lower for the four-year panel as compared with the single years
or the two year-panel.
Table 2 presents the summary of the trips taken by the respondents to lakes in Iowa.
The table presents two sets of statistics - one for the entire sample in each year or panel
and the second for only those respondents who took one or more trips. For the second set
of statistics we exclude individuals who did not take any trips in that year. The average
number of trips for all individuals ranged between 6.4 and 7.5 (column 3). Between 64%
and 66.5% of all respondents in 2003, 2004 and 2005 took one or more trips during the year.
The proportion of positive trip takers in 2002 was lower at around 59%. The average trips
of those who took positive trips moved around 11 in each of the four years. The proportion
of positive trip takers was higher in the four-year panel as compared with the single year
data for all years. However, the average trips for all respondents was not systematically
different for the four-year panel as compared with the single year data. This was because
the average trips of positive trip takers was lower, albeit marginally, in the four-year panel
as compared with the single year data. The maximum trips of all trip takers is curtailed
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at 52 because we exclude individuals who report taking more than 52 trips in a year.
While this is an arbitrary threshold, it helps to exclude those that live close to a lake and
happen to pass the lake in course of other daily activities. The purpose of the paper is
to model recreational day trips to lakes and this arbitrary cutoff provides us with a set of
observations whose trips closely resemble what we are trying to model.
Table 3 presents pair-wise comparison across years of mean trips taken by all individuals
and lake users and the percentage of trip takers in the sample. The differences that show
up in tables 2 and 3 are statistically tested in tables 4 and 5. Table 4 presents the t-statistic
for testing the differences across years in (i) trips of all respondents; (ii) trips of lake users;
(iii) the number of lakes visited and (iv) the percentage of non-users in the sample. For
each pair of years, the statistic is calculated using a sample of all individuals who responded
in both of those years but not necessarily in any of the other years. Table 5 presents the
t-statistics calculated using information for individuals who responded to the survey in
all four years. Table 4 indicates that the mean trips of all respondents were significantly
different between 2003 and 2004 but not for the other years. The mean trips of trip takers
were not significantly different for any pair of years.
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Table 1.1 Summary of returns Respondents who do not visit any lake &
average number of lakes visited
Lakes visited34
Year Returns1 Novisits2 % Novisits Mean STDev Max
2002 3897 1607 41.2 1.8 2.5 31
2003 4579 1548 33.8 2.4 2.9 22
2004 3826 1356 35.4 2.4 3.1 30
2005 3516 1177 33.4 2.5 3.2 32
Individuals who responded in both 2002 and 2003
2002 2644 1014 38.4 1.9 2.6 31
2003 918 34.7 2.3 2.9 22
Individuals who responded in 2002, 2003 and 2004
2002 2033 758 37.3 2.0 2.5 19
2003 673 33.1 2.4 2.9 22
2004 740 36.4 2.3 3.0 30
Individuals who responded every year of the survey 2002-05
2002 1621 584 36.0 2.0 2.5 19
2003 524 32.3 2.4 2.9 20
2004 575 35.5 2.4 3.1 30
2005 542 33.4 2.5 2.9 24
1. Number of respondents in each year
2. Number of individuals who stated that they did not visit any lake in that year
3. Number of lakes that individuals report visiting in that year
4. Those who reported more than 52 trips in any year excluded from the sample
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Table 1.2 Number of Trips to All Lakes1,2
Year Returns Trips Trips of positive trip-takers Max
Mean Stdev % Taking trips Mean Stdev
2002 3897 6.4 10.1 58.8 10.8 11.2 52
2003 4579 7.3 10.2 66.2 11.1 10.7 52
2004 3826 6.9 9.9 64.6 10.8 10.6 52
2005 3516 7.5 10.4 66.5 11.2 11.0 52
Individuals who responded in both 2002 and 2003
2002 2644 6.5 9.8 61.6 10.5 10.7 51
2003 7.0 9.9 65.3 10.7 10.5 52
Individuals who responded in 2002, 2003 and 2004
2002 2033 6.5 9.6 62.7 10.4 10.4 51
2003 7.2 9.9 66.9 10.8 10.4 52
2004 6.3 9.0 63.6 9.9 9.5 51
Individuals who responded every year of the survey 2002-05
2002 1621 6.6 9.4 64.0 10.3 10.0 51
2003 7.3 9.8 67.7 10.8 10.3 52
2004 6.5 9.0 64.5 10.1 9.5 51
2005 6.9 9.4 66.6 10.5 9.9 52
1. Excluding individuals who took trips but did not disclose the number of trips taken
2. Excluding individuals who took more than 52 trips in any year
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Table 1.3 Pair-wise Comparison across Years of Trips to All Lakes1
Trips Trips of positive trip takers
Pair Returns Year Mean Stdev Mean Stdev % pos2
2002/2003 2644 2002 6.5 9.8 10.5 10.7 61.6
2003 7.0 9.9 10.7 10.5 65.3
2002/2004 2278 2002 6.4 9.8 10.5 10.7 60.8
2004 6.3 9.1 10.0 9.7 63.2
2002/2005 2097 2002 6.6 9.9 10.6 10.7 61.6
2005 7.0 10.0 10.8 10.6 65.4
2003/2004 3382 2003 7.4 10.1 10.9 10.5 67.8
2004 6.8 9.6 10.5 10.2 64.6
2003/2005 3142 2003 7.5 10.2 11.1 10.7 67.6
2005 7.2 9.9 10.8 10.4 66.5
2004/2005 2960 2004 7.1 9.9 10.8 10.4 65.8
2005 7.4 10.0 10.8 10.5 67.9
1. Excluding individuals who took trips but did not disclose the number of trips taken
2. Percentage of respondents who took positive trips
Table 1.4 T-Statistic to Test for Pairwise Differences using Two-Year Pan-
els 1
Years Sample Size T-Statistic
Trips Positive Trips2 Lakes visited Novisits
2002-03 2644 -1.76 -0.51 -4.73 2.74
2002-04 2278 0.29 1.73 -4.44 1.65
2002-05 2097 -1.57 -0.36 -5.11 2.53
2003-04 3382 2.52 1.59 0.52 -2.73
2003-05 3142 1.27 1.11 -0.43 -0.97
2004-05 2960 -0.92 -0.04 -0.52 1.74
1. Sample size is different for each pair of years and consists of the same individuals
for each pair but not necessarily across pairs.
2. Excluding individuals who took trips but did not disclose the number of trips taken
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Table 1.5 T-Statistic to Test for Pairwise Differences for Full Four-year
Panel 1
Trips Positive Trips 2 Lakes visited No visits
2002-03 -1.99 -1.21 -4.16 2.22
2002-04 0.25 0.62 -3.73 0.33
2002-05 -1.06 -0.36 -4.34 1.55
2003-04 2.27 1.85 0.25 -1.89
2003-05 0.95 0.86 -1.15 -0.67
2004-05 -1.32 -1.00 0.40 1.22
1. The sample consists of the same 1621 individuals for every year
2. Excluding individuals who took trips but did not disclose the number of trips taken
Table 1.6 Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Years Income($1000s) Age Travel Cost Secchi Depth
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
2002 57.9 5 170 52.2 17 80 136.0 0.5 750.2 1.2 0.1 5.7
2003 58.8 5 170 53.1 21.5 80 140.1 0.5 934.8 1.5 0.2 8.1
2004 61.8 5 170 54.0 17 80 144.5 0.5 937.2 1.1 0.2 5.1
2005 61.8 5 170 54.8 17 80 149.2 0.5 944.5 1.2 0.1 5.7
Column 4 of table 4 indicates that the number of lakes visited by each individual in
2002 differed significantly from the number of lakes visited by all individuals in 2003, 2004,
2005. The number of lakes visited by each individual were not significantly different in 2003,
2004 and 2005 (column 5). The proportion of non-users in the sample was significantly
higher in 2002 as compared with 2003 and 2005. The proportion of non-users in 2004 was
significantly higher in 2004 as compared with 2003.
Table 5 confirms the significant differences in number of lakes visited in 2002 and the
three following years. It also confirms in the significant differences in the proportion of
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non-users in 2002 as compared with 2003.
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for the other regressors of the model. For the
purposes of this paper, the only demographic variable used was age and the only water
quality measure used was secchi transparency, also know as secchi depth. Secchi depth
is a measure of clarity of the water in a lake - it indicates how deep into the water one
can see. It is one of the most easily observed and understood water quality measures.
The other variables of interest are income and travel cost. Travel distance and time for
each household to each lake was estimated using the PC Miler software. Travel cost was
computed using a fixed amount per mile and the imputed cost of time. The per mile cost
was the same for each household and was fixed at $0.25, $0.26, $0.265 and $0.28 for 2002,
2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. The increasing mileage cost is meant to reflect rising
gasoline prices and general inflation. However, the increases are arbitrary and not derived
from a consumer price index or oil price index.
The opportunity cost of time for each household depends on the average wage rate
for that household. It is derived by dividing the yearly income by 2000, which is average
number of hours worked in a year after accounting for two weeks of leave (50 weeks at
40 hours a week). This is an average measure that allows us to translate the income in
the household to the cost of its time. It is not meant to substitute for exact information
on wage rates. For the purposes of this paper, the opportunity cost of time is given
by one-third of the wage rate computed this way. This is a fairly standard method of
calculating the time cost in recreation demand. However, there have been many studies
arguing against the use of income or wage rate as a reliable measure of the opportunity cost
of time (Shaw, 1992; Feather and Shaw, 1999; McKean et al., 2003). An obvious problem
is that it does not reflect the opportunity cost of time for students, the unemployed, the
retired, or homemakers. Further, salaried individuals usually do not have the option to
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work greater hours for more pay or fewer hours for less pay. Without the choice to work
more or fewer hours, the wage rates for salaried individuals do not reflect the opportunity
cost of their time either. Working time forgone is not the only opportunity cost of travel
time to recreational sites. Other alternative uses for travel time include voluntary work
and other recreational activities (Beal, 1995). Shaw (1992) suggested that the value of time
need not equal the cost of time. For instance, a person with a low wage rate may place very
high value on her time. Further, it is usually assumed that the travel to a recreational site
does not provide any utility in itself. That is a questionable assumption because individuals
may enjoy driving to a lake some distance away. In this case, the opportunity cost of time
will be lower than what is measured by the wage rate.
In practice, however, a fraction of the wage rate has often been used as a proxy for the
opportunity cost of time (Phaneuf et al., 2000; von Haefen et al., 2004; Egan et al., 2009).
There has been some discussion on what the appropriate fraction of wage rate should be.
There appears to be a consensus in the literature on 25% being the lower bound and 100%
being the upper bound (Parsons et al., 2003). In this range, 33% is the most commonly used
fraction (Hellerstein, 1993; Moeltner, 2005). Differences in travel cost are not the focus of
this paper. Hence, we choose to approximate opportunity cost of time by one-third of the
wage rate, even as we recognize the limitations of this approach.
We have complete trip information for a full four-year panel of 1621 observations.
Complete information on income and other demographic variables is not available for all of
these individuals. We have complete information required for our model for all four years
for 1280 individuals. The information in table 6 is for these 1280 observations.
As Table 6 indicates, secchi depth of all lakes ranged between less than 20 centimeters
to more than 5.5 meters in three of the four years. In 2003 there was an increase in the
maximum secchi depth of Lake Okoboji, the clearest lake in the state, to over eight meters.
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The average secchi depth was between one and 1.5 meters. Travel cost ranged from 45
cents to over $940 for a two-way trip with the mean around $140 in all four years.
Survey respondents were asked to indicate which of 14 income and seven age categories
they belonged to. Everyone belonging to an age category was assigned the median age for
that category. The same was done for income. The mean income in all four years was close
to $60,000 per annum and increased every year. The mean age in all four years was around
53 years.
1.4 Results
As a first step, the Kuhn-Tucker model was estimated separately for each year. Table 7
presents the parameter estimates from this estimation process. All of the parameters of this
simplified model are highly significant for each of the four years. Further, the parameters
have similar signs and are of the same order of magnitude over the years suggesting that
preferences were consistent over the time considered. The coefficient for secchi depth is
positive as expected. The coefficient of age is positive too. This may be counterintuitive
and conceal two different effects. Initially, when young adults grow older, they get jobs,
have higher incomes, acquire families and tend to take more trips. After reaching middle
age, trips taken tend to plateau and then fall as they grow older. The number of trips
taken may increase after retirement and then fall off as the household grows older. The
number of recreational trips, therefore, are expected to be positively correlated with age
up to a point and then negatively correlated with age.
The single year estimates do not account for correlation in preferences across time. To
model correlation in preferences we adopt two approaches - (i) bootstrapping from the
sample and estimating the model for each of four years for each draw. Thus the model is
estimated for each year for exactly the same individuals, which incorporates the correlation
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across time implicitly into our estimates. The second approach is to model the correlation
explicitly using a parameter of correlation.
1.4.1 Bootstrap Exercise
Bootstrapping offers a way to model the correlation in preferences across time in our
model without using a parameter of correlation. To implement this method we draw with
replacement, a random sample of 1280 households from our dataset. We estimate a single
year model without correlation for each of the four years for this sample. Since the data for
each of the four years consists of the same set of households, the correlation in preferences
is subsumed in the other parameters of the model. We do this 1000 times and compute
the mean willingness to pay for an improvement in Secchi depth of all lakes at least to
the level of lake Okoboji (5.66 meters) in each year for each of the 1000 draws. We then
compute the differences in parameters and welfare estimates across the years and check to
see if the 95% confidence intervals for each of these differences contain zero.
Table 8 presents the 95% confidence intervals for the differences in the parameter es-
timates. All of the differences are obtained by subtracting the estimate for the later year
from the estimate for the earlier year. If the 95% confidence interval for the difference
in the parameter estimate for a pair of years does not contain zero within it, it indicates
that the difference is significantly different from zero. In other words, it indicates that
the estimates for that parameter for the two years are significantly different from each
other. Table 9 presents the percentage of the differences in parameter estimates that were
positive. Percentages above 90% and below 10% indicate significant differences in the
parameter estimates for that pair of years.
As tables 8 and 9 indicate, there are significant differences in the parameter estimates
across years. In other words, parameter estimates do not appear to be stable over time.
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To check whether these estimates are substantively different, we look at welfare estimates
for each year for each of these 1000 draws. Welfare estimates are computed for a policy
that increases the secchi depth of all 127 lakes to at least 5.6 meters which is the secchi
depth of lake Okoboji, the clearest lake in Iowa. Table 10 presents the differences in
welfare estimates across years in terms of 95% confidence intervals and the percentages of
differences that are positive. Table 10 indicates that welfare estimates are significantly
different between all pairs of years except 2002 and 2005, and between 2003 and 2005.
The bootstrap approach is more flexible compared to the error components approach
presented in the following subsection. This is because the bootstrap approach does not
impose a structure on the correlation and does not require any assumptions about the
distribution of the correlation term. Further, the bootstrap approach can accommodate
a greater number of variables without getting computationally intractable. In the error
components approach, adding one variable will require four parameters to be estimated for
the four years in the panel, which will greatly increase the computing time required for the
estimation to converge. However, if the error components models is correctly specified, its
parameter estimates will be more efficient as compared with estimates from the bootstrap
approach.
1.4.2 Correlation Term Constant Across Sites and Distributed Normally with
Mean Zero
The next step was to estimate the model over a panel dataset taking into account
correlations across time and sites for each individual. The unobservable individual-specific
effect is given by ui which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and a
standard deviation given by σu. Two models were estimated. The first model restricts the
parameters to be the same for each year in the panel. The second model removes that
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restriction and allows different parameters for each year in the panel. Table 11 presents
the results of the restricted model for a two-year panel (2002-03) and a four-year panel
(2002-05). The parameter estimates from the two-year panel are of similar sign and
order of magnitude as the single year estimates. In the two-year panel, the coefficient of
age is not significant. All other parameters are highly significant for both panels. One
parameter of interest here is the scale parameter associated with the correlation term. It
is highly significant indicating the presence of correlations across time and site for each
individual. Table 11 presents the results of the unrestricted model for a two-year panel.
A likelihood ratio test (Table 12) rejects the restricted model in favor of the unrestricted
model. This indicates that even though parameters are mostly consistent in sign across
the years, there are changes in their magnitude that are statistically significant. We have
estimated a simple specification of the Kuhn-Tucker model. However, if our specification
of the model is correct, then the above result indicates that preferences are not stable over
time. This is something that policy-makers need to take into account while computing wel-
fare changes from possible policy measures. Alternatively, it is possible that the differences
in the parameter estimates reflect the effect of omitted variables that affect preferences and
changed across the four years in question.
1.4.3 Correlation Term Not Constant Across Sites and Normally Distributed
Next we consider the case when the error component that induces correlation across
time is not constant across sites. The correlation term is given by τij which is drawn from
a normal distribution with mean zero and a variance given by σ2τ . The restricted model
is estimated for a two-year and a four-year panel. The unrestricted model is estimated
for a two year and a four year panel. Table 14 presents the parameter estimates for
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the restricted model with a two-year and a four-year panel dataset. As before, all the
parameters of the model are highly significant. In particular the variance of the correlation
term is highly significant indicating that preferences are correlated across time. Table
15 presents the parameter estimates for the two-year unrestricted model. The parameter
estimates, which are all highly significant, are also of the same sign and roughly the same
magnitude for the two years.
A likelihood ratio test (Table 16) rejects the restricted model in favor of the unrestricted
model for the two-year panel dataset. This again confirms the fact that parameters of the
model vary across years. The likelihood ratio test establishes that parameter estimates
for the Kuhn-Tucker model are not stable over time for our dataset. To check if the
variation in parameter estimates translates into substantive changes in welfare estimates,
we compute welfare estimates for four years using the estimates from the restricted and
unrestricted models when the correlation terms is given by τij . Mean willingness to pay
is computed for an improvement in the secchi depth of all 127 lakes to the level of the
clearest lake, i.e. to 5.6 meters. Table 19 presents the welfare estimates for this change for
both the restricted and unrestricted models Table 19 indicates that there is a substantive
difference in the welfare estimates derived from the unconstrained and the constrained
model. This indicates that instability of parameter estimates over time translate into
substantive differences in the respective welfare estimates. However, the welfare estimates
are not systematically biased in one way or another between the two models.
The recent interest in Kuhn-Tucker models has been enabled by the availability of
greater computing power. There have been large improvements in the computing ability
and speed in the ten years since Phaneuf et al. 2000 used numerical integration to im-
plement the Kuhn-Tucker models. Allowing for correlation across time required a second
degree of integration which pushed the limits of our computing capacity . The estimations
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were done using the Maxlik package on GAUSS. The four year unrestricted models for the
two versions of the error term converged in 102 and 117 iterations respectively. These iter-
ations took, respectively, 178.1 hours and 213.6 hours to run. This is one of the reasons for
choosing a very parsimonious model for this paper. Adding one extra variable to the model
would require the program to optimize over four additional parameters when estimating
the four year unconstrained model. This would increase the computing time by close to
20% over the present setup where the four year unconstrained model requires optimizing
over 21 parameters.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provided a method for incorporating correlation in preferences across time
in a Kuhn-Tucker model of recreation demand with a large choice set. The method was
implemented using a panel dataset of trips made by a random sample of Iowa households
to 127 lakes in Iowa and was used to examine if preferences are stable across time. This is
a logical next step from Phaneuf et al. (2000) and von Haefen et al. (2004) in extending
the application of the Kuhn-Tucker approach for modeling recreation demand data. The
Kuhn-Tucker model deals with a large number of corner solutions typical of recreation
demand data, in an internally consistent utility theoretic framework. The decision to take
a trip or not, the selection of the site and number of trips, if trips are taken are derived
from the same model. The availability of a panel dataset with information on trips taken
in four consecutive years allowed us to examine of parameter estimates in the Kuhn-Tucker
framework are stable over time. Most policy relating to provision of outdoor recreational
and other environmental amenities involve costs spread over an extended time period and
expect to create welfare gains over more than just a single period. If parameter estimates
are not stable over time, projecting welfare estimates computed using a single year of data
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may be misleading for cost benefit analysis.
We find that household preferences are significantly correlated across time. In addition,
for our specification of the model and dataset, parameter estimates are not stable across
time. The instability of parameter estimates across the years translates into substantive
differences in the corresponding welfare estimates. This implies that using a single year
of data to evaluate medium or long-term welfare changes from a policy measure may be
misleading. The instability of parameter estimates over time could be driven by changes in
other demographic variables not included in the model or even macroeconomic variables.
Consequently, models that are parsimonious, such as the one used in this paper, may be
more likely to yield parameter estimates that are not stable over time. Even models that
include a large number of variables may yield parameter estimates that vary over time,
if there are substantial differences in the macroeconomic environment from year to year.
Therefore, greater deliberation needs to go into projecting welfare estimates from one year
into other years. In particular, adjustments need to be made to account for changes in
macroeconomic environment. Further, if it is known beforehand that one year’s welfare
estimates are going to be projected into future years, it might be useful to choose a more
detailed model over a parsimonious one.
While the model in the current paper includes only one demographic variable and one
water quality variable, the framework can accommodate any number of demographic and
site attribute variables. All the models in this paper were estimated using a balanced panel
of 1280 individuals. Using a balanced panel requires dropping a number of observations
from the dataset. Estimating the restricted and unrestricted models with an unbalanced
panel will allow us to use the information in the complete dataset. These constitute the
agenda for future work.
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Table 1.7 Single Year Estimates of Simple Model
2002 2003 2004 2005
Constant -8.24** -8.86** -8.47** -8.47**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Age 4.98** 11.22** 5.44** 7.94**
(0.84) (0.85) (0.82) (0.80)
Secchi Depth 9.37** 9.76** 13.30** 8.26**
(1.05) (0.86) (1.18) (1.00)
Theta1 1.36** 1.26** 1.24** 1.23**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Sigma2 0.24** 0.36** 0.30** 0.27**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Obs 1280 1280 1280 1280
Mean log lik -12.84 -15.41 -14.94 -14.95
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal distribution
**: Significant at 1% level
Table 1.8 Differences in Parameter Estimates across Years: 95% Confi-
dence Intervals
Years Constant Age Secchi Depth Theta1 Sigma2
2002-03 0.39 – 0.82 -9.13 – -3.23 -2.70 – 1.66 0.03 – 0.16 -0.16 – -0.07
2002-04 -0.03 – 0.47 -3.92 – 3.05 -6.60 – 1.16 0.06 – 0.20 -0.10 – -0.01
2002-05 -0.02 – 0.45 -6.68 – -0.62 -1.34 – 3.46 0.06 – 0.20 -0.08 – 0.02
2003-04 -0.62 – -0.16 2.80 – 8.75 -5.75 – -1.19 -0.04 – 0.09 0.01 – 0.10
2003-05 -0.60 – -0.19 0.25 – 6.19 -0.84 – 3.80 -0.03 – 0.10 0.04 – 0.12
2004-05 -0.21 – 0.20 -5.59 – 0.71 2.28 – 7.49 -0.05 – 0.06 -0.01 – 0.07
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal distribution for the error
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Table 1.9 Differences in Parameter Estimates across Years: Percentage
Positive
Years Constant Age Secchi Depth Theta1 Sigma2
2002-03 100 0.0 36.0 99.8 0.0
2002-04 96.4 40.9 0.1 99.9 0.4
2002-05 95.7 5.9 80.1 100.0 7.8
2003-04 0.0 100.0 0.1 79.1 99.0
2003-05 0.0 98.4 89.6 84.2 100.0
2004-05 49.2 6.3 100.0 58.7 92.2
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal distribution for the error
Table 1.10 Differences in Welfare Estimates across Years: 95% Confidence
Intervals and Percentage Positive
Years 95% Confidence Interval Percentage positive
2002-03 -55.61 – 9.35 9.5
2002-04 -156.22 – -53.14 0.0
2002-05 -51.33 – 26.66 25.8
2003-04 -127.48 – -34.66 0.1
2003-05 -28.96 – 50.09 66.2
2004-05 37.80 – 143.63 99.9
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Table 1.11 Restricted Model Estimated for Two-Year and Four-year Panels
Two-year Panel Four-year Panel
(2002-03) (2002-04)
Constant -7.9** -7.80**
(0.08) (0.06)
Age 5.28** 3.05*
(1.38) (1.04)
Secchi Depth 9.42** 9.09**
(0.57) (0.43)
Theta1 1.44** 1.38**
(0.02) (0.01)
Sigma2 0.03** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr3 -0.27** -0.24**
(0.03) (0.02)
No. of Obs 1280 1280
Mean log lik -26.02 -52.85
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal error
3. Log of the standard deviation for the correlation term
* and ** indicate significance of levels 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.12 Unrestricted Model Estimated for a Two-Year Panel
Parameter Estimates for
2002 2003
Constant -7.60** -8.14**
(0.09) (0.09)
Age 1.84 7.72**
(1.48) (1.49)
Secchi Depth 8.74** 9.03**
(0.91) (0.75)
Theta1 1.48** 1.39**
(0.03) (0.03)
Sigma2 -0.05** 0.09**
(0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr3 -0.25**
(0.02)
No. of Obs 1280 1280
Mean log lik -25.95
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal error
3. Log of the standard deviation for the correlation term
* and ** indicate significance of levels 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.13 Unrestricted Model Estimated with Full Four-Year
Panel ui ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
2002 2003 2004 2005
Constant -7.50** -7.98** -7.63** -7.72**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Age -1.40 4.34** 0.05 2.32**
(0.94) (0.95) (0.35) (0.91)
Secchi Depth 8.82** 9.00** 12.00** 7.62**
(0.92) (0.75) (1.01) (0.88)
Theta 1.46** 1.38** 1.36** 1.34**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Sigma -0.17** 0.10** -0.00** 0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr -0.23**
(0.02)
No. of Obs 1280
Mean log lik -52.76
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal distribution
*: Significant at 1% level
Table 1.14 Likelihood Ratio Test between Restricted and Unrestricted
Models
Year Mean log-likelihood LR Stat Crit. Value—
Unrestr. Model Restr. Model at 1%
2002-03 -25.95 -26.01 161.02 15.09
2002-05 -52.76 -52.85 238.85 30.58
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Table 1.15 Restricted Model Estimated for Two-Year and Four-year
Panels:τij ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
Two-year Panel Four-year Panel
(2002-03) (2002-04)
Constant -8.57** -8.54**
(0.05) (0.03)
Age 8.42** 7.72**
(0.59) (0.41)
Secchi Depth 10.07** 9.66**
(0.66) (0.49)
Theta1 1.32** 1.26**
(0.02) (0.01)
Sigma2 0.30** 0.27**
(0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr3 -1.71** 1.26**
(0.08) (0.03)
No. of Obs 1280 1280
Mean log lik -28.28 -57.93
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal error
3. Log of the standard deviation for the correlation term
* and ** indicate significance of levels 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.16 Unrestricted Model Estimated for a Two-Year
Panel:τij ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
Parameter Estimates for
2002 2003
Constant -8.24** -8.85**
(0.06) (0.07)
Age 4.96** 11.20**
(0.83) (0.84)
Secchi Depth 9.18** 9.73**
(1.05) (0.86)
Theta1 1.36** 1.26**
(0.03) (0.03)
Sigma2 0.23** 0.35**
(0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr3 -1.70**
(0.08)
No. of Obs 1280 1280
Mean log lik -28.24
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal error
3. Log of the standard deviation for the correlation term
* and ** indicate significance of levels 5% and 1%, respectively
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Table 1.17 Unrestricted Model Estimated with Full Four-Year
Panel::τij ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
2002 2003 2004 2005
Constant -8.31** -8.89** -8.50** -8.52**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Age -5.13** 11.43** 5.52** 8.03**
(0.83) (0.84) (0.82) (0.80)
Secchi Depth 8.75** 9.52** 13.39** 7.83**
(1.06) (0.86) (1.18) (1.01)
Theta 1.33** 1.24** 1.22** 1.20**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Sigma 0.20** 0.31** -0.26** 0.23**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sigmacorr -0.89**
(0.02)
No. of Obs 1280
Mean log lik -57.53
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation of the normal distribution
*: Significant at 1% level
Table 1.18 Likelihood Ratio Test between Restricted and Unrestricted
Models when τij ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
Year Mean log-likelihood LR Stat Crit. Value—
Unrestr. Model Restr. Model at 1%
2002-03 -28.24 -28.28 122.62 15.09
2002-05 -57.53 -57.94 1036.03 30.58
35
Table 1.19 Year-wise Welfare Estimates in Dollars for an Improvement in
Secchi Depth of all Lakes to at least 5.6m:τij ∼ N(0, σ2τ )
Constrained Model Unconstrained Model
2002 268.26 201.24
2003 261.07 285.99
2004 304.05 441.22
2005 294.45 239.27
No. of Obs 1280
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CHAPTER 2. THE EFFECT OF THE SOURCE OF ERROR ON
WELFARE MEASURES IN A KUHN-TUCKER MODEL
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the main goals of recreation demand
models is to estimate changes in welfare from changes in the quality and availability of
environmental goods. Benefits estimates computed from these studies inform decisions of
policymakers on the the optimal allocation of resources for the provision and maintenance
of public goods. The typical way these models are used is to examine whether a proposed
change in the availability, quality or price of a public good will result in a net increase in
welfare over all individuals affected.
An important component of all regression analyses is the regression error. In the
context of recreation demand models, the source of the regression error can be of prime
importance. This is because, the way welfare estimates are computed for these models may
differ depending on what the regression error represents. Most recreation demand models
assume the error term to represent heterogeneity in preferences - arising out of some factor
that is known to the consumer but not to the researcher. Hence, the expected consumer
surplus from hypothetical changes in price and quality attributes of a site is estimated by
drawing randomly from the assumed distribution of the errors and averaging the estimates
over all draws. However, other sources of error have been discussed in the literature.
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The error term has variously been traced to socioeconomic factors that is known to
the individual but not to the researcher (Gum and Martin, 1975), randomness in human
behavior (Hanemann,1983), measurement error in the dependent variable (Hiett and Wor-
rall, 1977) and measurement errors in the explanatory variables (Brown et. al, 1983).
Bockstael and Strand (1987), discuss four possible sources for the error in regression: (i)
omitted variables; (ii) randomness in preferences; (iii)error in the measurement of the de-
pendent variable and (iv) error in the measurement of one or more independent variables.
The heterogeneity in preferences as modeled in standard recreation demand models, derives
from omitted variables as discussed by Bockstael and Strand (1987). It is important to note
that regression error arising out of the first three sources can still satisfy the Gauss-Markov
conditions, while error on account of wrongly measured independent variables will not be
orthogonal to the independent variables. Hence, estimating a model where the regression
error refers to measurement errors in the independent variable will require corrections that
make the estimation process different from the process for models where the error derives
from the first three sources of error.
Bockstael and Strand (1987) consider only the first three sources of the regression error
in the context of linear or log linear demand functions and show that different sources of
error imply different welfare measures - higher welfare estimates associated are associated
with the regression error arising from heterogeneity in preferences as compared to random-
ness in preferences. Their findings cannot be extended automatically to non-linear models.
For a range of recreation demand models, including the Kuhn-Tucker models, the error
term enters the demand function in a more complex manner than the linear and log-linear
functions and it is not possible to isolate and sign the effect of the error term on the welfare
measure analytically. The purpose of this paper to explore the issue empirically.
There have been studies that assumed the regression error arising from sources other
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than heterogeneity in preferences in the context of non-linear models (Herriges et al., 1999;
Whitehead et al. 2000; Von Haefen et al., 2004), but none that conduct a systematic
empirical study of the welfare estimates under different sources of the error, especially in
the context of the highly non-linear Kuhn-Tucker framework. This paper fills that gap by
computing the welfare measures when the regression error arises from two different sources
in a Kuhn-Tucker model with non-linear demand functions. In case of linear or semi-log
demand functions Bockstael and Strand (1987) found that welfare estimates derived under
the assumption that the errors represent heterogeneity in preferences are likely to be larger
as compared with the estimates that are derived under the assumption that errors represent
randomness in preferences. If this result extends to the non-linear functions too, it would
suggest that careful consideration needs to go into the assumptions about the source of
the regression error to ensure that the welfare measure computed is truly indicative of the
benefits from a policy measure.
Kuhn-Tucker models are particularly suitable for studying site choice behavior when the
consumer chooses among several options. This is because the Kuhn-Tucker framework is
utility theoretic and can model the downward censored nature of trip data. In addition, the
high degree of non-linearity of the Kuhn-Tucker framework makes is a good case study for
undertaking the Bockstael and Strand (1987) kind of comparison in a non-linear framework.
In this paper, we estimate welfare measures using the Kuhn-Tucker model applied to
a large and unique data set: four years of recreation trips from a random sample survey
of Iowa residents regarding their use of 127 lakes. This is the same dataset that is used
in chapter 1. Both compensating and equivalent variation is estimated for the sample
separately for each of the four years - 2002-2005. In constructing the welfare measures,
we consider two interpretations of the error term - first, that it represents heterogeneity in
preferences on account of factors that are known to the individual but not to the researcher
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and second, that it arises from an inherent randomness in human behavior or circumstances
that cannot be predicted even by the individual in advance. Note, in both cases the
error term is associated with the demographic variable and enters the utility function in
an identical manner. The process of estimating the parameters are identical in the two
cases, but the process of computing welfare estimates are not. In both cases, the model
is correctly specified. Further, in both cases the regression error can safely be assumed
to satisfy identical regularity conditions. This is what makes them especially suitable for
comparing the effect of the source of error on welfare estimates.
Unlike Bockstael and Strand (1987), we do not focus on the case where the regression
error represents measurement errors in the dependent variable - the number of trips taken
in this case. In the linear demand functions studied by Bockstael and Strand (1987),
the error term was associated linearly with the demand function and was identical for the
three sources of regression error that they considered. In the Kuhn-Tucker model, the error
enters the utility function in a non-linear fashion in association with the demographic terms
for the first two cases, viz., heterogeneity in preferences and randomness in preferences.
As a result the regression error enters the demand function non-linearly too. But when
the regression error originates from incorrectly measured trips taken, it can no longer be
associated with the demographic variables and must enter the demand function linearly.
This will make the equations estimated different from the equations estimated in the first
two cases. Hence, we do not consider the case where error originates from measurement
errors in trip data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Kuhn-Tucker model
for estimating the parameters of the utility and demand functions. Section 3 discusses the
way the different welfare measures are estimated under the different interpretations of the
error term. Section 4 provides a brief overview of the data, section 5 discusses the results
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and section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
Assume that there are T periods and a total of M sites each having K characteristics.
The utility function for a household i in period t is given by
Uit =
M∑
j=1
exp(δ′Sit + ηijt)ln[exp(γ′qit)xijt + θ] + ln(zit), (2.1)
where
xijt = Number of trips taken by the ith individual to site j in period t,
Qt = [q1t, q2t...qMt], where qjt is a K by 1 vector of quality variables associated with site j,
Sit = the set of demographic characteristics for the ith household in period t
θ = parameter allowing for corner solutions,
ηi = an MT by 1 matrix of error terms for the ith individual,
Pijt = the ith individual’s cost of visiting site j in period t,
zit = a composite of all other goods (the numeraire and a necessary good),
γ and δ = parameters of the model.
In the standard Kuhn-Tucker model as estimated in chapter 1, ηijt would represent
heterogeneity in preferences - demographic or other systematic factors that are known
to the individual but unobserved by the researcher. In this case it could also stand for a
random error that is unknown to both the individual and the researcher. This specification
of the utility function is additively separable. Further, it assumes that every good (site in
this case) is a normal good and all goods are Hicksian substitutes. The utility function
also assumes weak complementarity meaning that quality attributes of a site do not affect
the total utility of the individual if the site is not visited (Maler, 1974). In other words,
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the individual cares about the quality attributes of only those sites that s/he visits. The
budget constraint for the individual in period t is
Yit =
M∑
j=1
Pijtxijt + zit;xijt ≥ 0; zit > 0∀i, j, t. (2.2)
The decision variables for individual i are xijt and zit. The number of trips to any lake
must be non-negative while the expenditure on the numeraire must be strictly positive.
The Kuhn-Tucker first order condition for the ith individual, in period t with respect to
the jth site implies
exp(δ′Sit + ηijt)
γ′qit)
[exp(γ′qit)xijt + θ]
− Pijt
zit
≤ 0, and
(exp(δTSit + ηijt)
exp(γT qjt)
[exp(γT qjt)xijt + θ]
− Pijt
zit
)xijt = 0
This in turn implies that
ηijt ≤ ln(Pijt
zit
) + ln[xijt +
θ
exp(γ′qit)
]− δ′Sit = g(xit, Pt, zit, Sit, qjt;β),
where β is the vector of parameters to be estimated. This also implies a demand function
of the form
xijt = Max
(
0,
exp
[
δTSit + ηijt
]
zit
Pjt
exp
(
γT qjt
)− θ
exp (γT qjt)
)
(3)
For each individual i in each period t, there are M such equations - one for each site.
These equations together with the assumed distribution of the error term define a likelihood
function which can then be used to estimate the parameters of the model.
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2.3 Welfare Measures
We consider a policy which improves one or more site quality attributes in one or more
sites and may involve corresponding changes in the access prices of those sites. Compen-
sating variation is given by the change in income required to ensure that the individual
has the same utility after the change as she did before. Thus, for a policy that improves
one or more site quality attributes, the compensating variation would be a measure of the
individual’s willingness to pay to obtain that change. Equivalent variation is given by the
change in income required to ensure that the individual does at least as well under the
current regime as she would under the new regime. For a policy change that worsens one
or more site quality attributes, the equivalent variation would indicate the willingness to
accept payment to allow that change.
Denoting the original price-quality configuration by
(
p0, q0
)
and the new price-quality
configuration by
(
p1, q1
)
compensating variation for the ith individual for this change is
defined as
CVi = yi − e
(
p1, q1;u0i
)
where
yi : income of the ith individual
u0i : maximum total utility of the ith individual at the
original price-quality configuration
e
(
p1, q1;u0i
)
: minimum expenditure required for the individual to attain u0i
at the new price-quality configuration
Similarly equivalent variation for the individual is defined as
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EVi = e
(
p0, q0;u1i
)− yi
where
u1i : maximum total utility that the individual can attain with the current income
at the new price-quality configuration
The compensating and equivalent variations can then be averaged over all individuals
in the sample to get an average measure of the welfare change. When the error term arises
from heterogeneity in preferences that is known to the individual, then the error term is
like an explanatory variable or a composite effect of explanatory factors. This is because
the error term stands in for some variable that affects utility and demand functions in a
systematic way. It should, therefore, be included in the calculation of demand and total
utility because excluding it will result in an omitted variable bias. On the other hand,
when the error term reflects a randomness in tastes and circumstances which affect trip
demand but cannot be predicted by the individual, the researcher is better off focusing on
the systematic portion of the trip demand. In this case, therefore, only the mean of the
error term should be incorporated into either trip demand or total utility. For the two
sources of error that we consider, the process for estimating the parameters of the model
are identical. The only difference is in the computation of welfare estimates. If we were
to consider, a model where the error term reflects inaccurate reporting of trips taken or
one of the explanatory variables, the process of estimating the parameters of the model
would be different since the corresponding regression equations would be different. For
this reason, it is useful in our context, to focus only on the first two sources of error which
provides us with a way to compare two cases that are nearly identical except in the last
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step, i.e. computation of welfare estimates. This is different from Bockstael and Strand
(1987) where the error term was associated with the demand function.
In the Kuhn-Tucker model with our specification of the utility function, there is no
analytical solution for either the compensating variation or the equivalent variation. Both
must be computed numerically. When the error term is to be included in the welfare
computation, for each individual we take 500 draws from the distribution of the error
and calculate demand at the initial and new regimes for each draw of the error. Thus
for each draw we have an estimate of the compensating and equivalent variations. The
compensating variation and equivalent variation for each individual are the averages of
each measure over all 500 error draws.
2.4 Data
The dataset for this analysis is the same as used in chapter 1. For four consecutive
years from 2002 to 2005, a survey questionnaire about trips to lakes in Iowa was sent out to
a random sample of households within the state. Each year about 4000 completed surveys
were returned. Of the returned surveys, information on some individuals could not be
used because the surveys were incomplete. Excluding those individuals for whom complete
information on trips taken was not available, we have about 3500 completed surveys in
each year except in 2003 for which we have about 4500 surveys. A complete four-year
panel is available for 1621 observations.
As discussed in chapter 1, 33-35% of respondents in 2003, 2004 and 2005 did not visit
any lake in Iowa. 41% of respondents in 2002 did not visit any lakes. The average number
of lakes visited by all respondents ranged between 1.8 and 2.5.
The average number of trips for all individuals ranged between 6.4 and 7.5. Between
64% and 66.5% of all respondents in 2003, 2004 and 2005 took one or more trips during
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the year. The proportion of positive trip takers in 2002 was lower at around 59%. The
average trips of those who took positive trips moved around 11 in each of the four years.
The proportion of positive trip takers was higher in the four-year panel as compared with
the single year data for all years. However, the average trips for all respondents was not
systematically different for the four-year panel as compared with the single year data. This
was because the average trips of positive trip takers was lower, albeit marginally, in the
four-year panel as compared with the single year data. As in Chapter 1, we are modeling
single-day trips to lakes for recreational purposes and do not consider overnight trips taken.
The maximum trips of all trip takers is curtailed at 52 because we exclude individuals who
report taking more than 52 trips in a year. While this is an arbitrary threshold, it helps to
exclude those that live close to a lake and happen to pass the lake in course of other daily
activities. Table 1 reproduces the information in Table 6 of chapter 1 to provide summary
statistics for the independent variables.
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Years Income($1000s) Age Travel Cost Secchi Depth
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
2002 57.9 5 170 52.2 17 80 136.0 0.5 750.2 1.2 0.1 5.7
2003 58.8 5 170 53.1 21.5 80 140.1 0.5 934.8 1.5 0.2 8.1
2004 61.8 5 170 54.0 17 80 144.5 0.5 937.2 1.1 0.2 5.1
2005 61.8 5 170 54.8 17 80 149.2 0.5 944.5 1.2 0.1 5.7
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the regressors of the model. For the purposes
of this paper, the only demographic variable used was age and the only water quality
measure used was secchi depth. Secchi depth is one of the most easily observed and
understood water quality measures. The other variables of interest are income and travel
cost. Travel distance and time for each household to each lake was estimated using the PC
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Miler software. Travel cost was computed using a fixed amount per mile and the imputed
cost of time. The per mile cost was the same for each household and was fixed at $0.25,
$0.26, $0.265 and $0.28 for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. The imputed cost of
time for each household depends on the average wage rate for that household calculated by
the yearly income divided by 2000, which is average number of hours worked in a year after
accounting for two weeks of leave. This is an average measure that allows us to translate
the income in the household to the cost of its time. It is not meant to substitute for exact
information on wage rates. We have complete trip information for a full four-year panel
of 1621 observations. Complete information on income and other demographic variables is
not available for all of these individuals. We have complete information required for our
model for all four years for 1280 individuals. The information in Table 1 is for these 1280
observations.
As Table 1 indicates, secchi depth of all lakes ranged between less than 20 centimeters
to more than 5.5 meters in three of the four years. In 2003 there was an increase in the
maximum secchi depth of Lake Okoboji, the clearest lake in the state, to over eight meters.
The average secchi depth of all lakes ranged between one and 1.5 meters in the four years
under consideration. Travel cost ranged from 45 cents to over $940 for a two-way trip with
the mean around $140 in all four years.
Survey respondents were asked to indicate which of 14 income and seven age categories
they belonged to. Everyone belonging to an age category was assigned the median age for
that category. The same was done for income. The mean income in all four years was close
to $60,000 per annum and increased every year. The mean age in all four years was around
53 years.
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2.5 Results
In estimating the model we assume that the error term follows a normal distribution
with mean zero and a variance that is estimated from the data. The errors are indepen-
dently and identically distributed for each individual and each site within a year. Table 2
presents the parameter estimates for each of the four years. All of the parameters of this
simplified model are highly significant for each of the four years. Further, the parameters
have similar signs and are of the same order of magnitude over the years suggesting that
preferences were consistent over the time considered. The coefficient for secchi depth is
positive as expected. The coefficient of age is positive too.
For the purposes of computing welfare estimates, two policy measures were considered.
In the first case, the secchi depth of all lakes are increased to at least 5.67 meters which is
the secchi depth of the clearest lake (Lake Okoboji) in three of the four years. Note that
this is an exceptionally large improvement meant to drive a large willingness to pay. For
many of the lakes in the dataset, increasing secchi depth to 5. 67 meters would amount to
an improvement of more than 500%. This is obviously not observed in reality. The access
price for each of the lakes remains unchanged. In this case, the willingness to pay should be
positive and the compensating variation should exceed the equivalent variation measure.
In the second case, 10 of the 127 sites were removed from the choice set. This was done by
raising the access price of each of these 10 lakes above the choke price, i.e. the price at which
all demand for trips to that lake falls to zero. The access prices for the other lakes were
left unchanged. In this case, the willingness to pay should be negative and the equivalent
variation should exceed the compensating variation. The welfare measures for the policies
were computed at the point estimates presented in Table 2 for two interpretations of the
error term. Tables 3 and 4 present the welfare estimates for the two policy measures.
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As expected, the equivalent variation in each case is of similar magnitude to the com-
pensating variation. If the error term is interpreted as heterogeneity in preferences, the
magnitude of the willingness to pay is substantially higher than if the error term is inter-
preted as randomness in preferences. This is true for both policies and for both compensat-
ing and equivalent variation measures of willingness to pay. For instance, the willingness to
pay for an improvement in secchi depth of all lakes to 5.67 meters ranged between $221 and
$460 when the error was assumed to come from heterogeneity in preferences. When the
error was assumed to arise from randomness in preferences, the corresponding willingness
to pay ranged between $0.40 and $1.30. Thus the benefits from policy 1 are substantially
lower if we assume the error term arising from randomness in preferences. This implies
that depending on the cost of undertaking such an improvement, assumptions about the
source of the error term can make a critical difference to whether a project is considered
worth undertaking or not.
Similarly for policy 2, the willingness to accept compensation to allow the removal of 10
lakes from the choice set ranged between $27 to $51, when the error was assumed to rep-
resent heterogeneity in preferences. When the error was assumed to represent randomness
in behavior, the corresponding willingness to accept compensation ranged between $0.01
amd $0.04. This indicates that the assumption about the source of the error can make a
crucial difference to the total benefit estimate and hence benefits net of costs of a project
that improves one or more sites.
The stark differences in the welfare measures associated with the two sources of re-
gression errors observed particularly in Table 3, can be traced to the way that the error
enters the utility function. From section 2, the error term enters the demand function
exponentially. Thus xijt is increasing and convex in ηijt. Consider a matrix ηit of N draws
of 127 error terms drawn from a mean zero distribution, for individual i in period t. Let
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xˆit be the corresponding Nx127 matrix of trips for this individual in the same period given
by
xˆijt =
exp
[
δTSit + ηijt
]
zit
Pjt
exp
(
γT qjt
)− θ
exp (γT qjt)
(2.3)
For the purposes of this thought experiment, we are not requiring the xˆijt to be non-
negative. Thus the matrix xˆit consists of both negative and positive numbers. Let ¯ˆxit be
the mean of the matrix xˆit over the N draws. Thus ¯ˆxit is a 1x127 vector. The mean of ηit,
barηit is a 127x1 vector of numbers that are very close to zero because the errors are drawn
from a mean zero distribution. The untruncated trip vector corresponding to barηit is a
1x127 vector, which we will call ˜ˆxit. Let xit be the truncated trip vector corresponding to
ηit and given by
xijt = Max
(
0,
exp
[
δTSit + ηijt
]
zit
Pjt
exp
(
γT qjt
)− θ
exp (γT qjt)
)
(3)
Let x¯it be the mean of xit over the error draws. xit is of dimension Nx127, while x¯it is of
dimension 1x127. Since xijt is increasing and convex in ηijt, by Jensen’s inequality ¯ˆxit > ˜ˆxit.
xˆit contains both positive and negative terms while xit is left-truncated. Hence x¯it ≥ ¯ˆxit.
Together, these two inequalities imply that x¯it ≥ ¯ˆxit > ˜ˆxit. This explains why mean trips
in our model are not just higher but are substantially higher when we average over the
error draws than when we compute them at the mean of the error draws which is zero.
The predicted trips under the two conditions before and after the improvement on account
of policy 1 are presented in Table 5. As before, when the error reflects heterogeneity in
preferences, the predicted trips should be averaged over all error draws. When the error
reflects randomness in preferences, the predicted trips should include only the mean of the
error draws, which, in this case is zero. As Table 5 shows, error reflecting heterogeneity in
preferences is associated with much higher predicted trips than error reflecting randomness
in preferences. This is true both before and after the improvement. The large differences
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in welfare estimates associated with the two error interpretations is driven largely by this
difference in predicted trips. But the effect of the error term on welfare estimates is further
exaggerated by the fact that the error term enters the indirect utility function in two ways
- directly with the demographic variables and indirectly through the trip demand. The
indirect utility function in our model is given by
Uit =
M∑
j=1
exp(δ′Sit+ηijt)ln[exp(γ′qit)Max
(
0,
exp
[
δTSit + ηijt
]
zit
Pjt
exp
(
γT qjt
)− θ
exp (γT qjt)
)
+θ]+ln(zit)
(2.4)
This further amplifies the impact of large positive error draws on the indirect utility func-
tion. The effect of large negative draws are muted by the fact that for large negative draws,
trip demand is zero - the same as for smaller negative draws. Thus non-linearity of the
indirect utility function in the error term, together with the left-ward truncated nature of
trip demand amplifies the effect of large positive error draws and mutes the effect of large
negative error draws, thus resulting in welfare estimates which are substantially higher
than the estimates computed with the error draw set at zero.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter sought to examine if the source of the error term in a Kuhn-Tucker model
of recreation demand makes a material difference to welfare estimates from hypothetical
changes to site quality attributes. Earlier studies have examined this question in the con-
text of linear and semi-log demand functions where the error term is associated additively
with trip demand. There have been no systematic empirical studies to answer this ques-
tion in the context of non-linear demand functions. The Kuhn-Tucker model is highly
non-linear and so it is not possible to analytically map the source of the error to the size of
the welfare estimate in such a model. Using four years of data on a sample of Iowa house-
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holds’ demand for trips to lakes in Iowa, I examine the welfare estimates associated with
two interpretations of the error term, viz., heterogeneity in preferences and randomness
in behavior. I find that the source of the error does make a difference to the magnitudes
of both compensating variation and equivalent variation from a change in some site qual-
ity attributes in one or more lakes. Specifically, benefits estimates associated with error
arising out of heterogeneity in preferences are systematically larger than benefits estimates
associated with the error arising out of randomness in behavior. This is consistent with
the findings of Bockstael and Strand (1987) with linear and semi-log demand functions.
It is, therefore, important to carefully consider the source of the error when using these
measures to determine if a project is worth undertaking or not.
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Table 2.2 Single Year Estimates of Simple Model
2002 2003 2004 2005
Constant -8.24** -8.86** -8.47** -8.47**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Age 4.98** 11.22** 5.44** 7.94**
(0.84) (0.85) (0.82) (0.80)
Secchi Depth 9.37** 9.76** 13.30** 8.26**
(1.05) (0.86) (1.18) (1.00)
Theta1 1.36** 1.26** 1.24** 1.23**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Sigma2 0.24** 0.36** 0.30** 0.27**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of Obs 1280 1280 1280 1280
Mean log lik -12.84 -15.41 -14.94 -14.95
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors
1. Log of the parameter that allows corner solutions
2. Log of the standard deviation for the normal distribution
**: Significant at 1% level
Table 2.3 Mean CV and EV in dollars under Policy 1: Secchi Depth of all
lakes improved to at least 5.67 m
Error reflects 2002 2003 2004 2005
CV
Heterogeneity 221.64 302.60 447.50 250.70
Randomness 0.70 0.42 1.20 0.72
EV
Heterogeneity 225.26 308.02 457.90 254.18
Randomness 0.79 0.44 1.29 0.76
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Table 2.4 Mean CV and EV in dollars under Policy 2: Ten lakes are re-
moved from the choice set
Error reflects 2002 2003 2004 2005
CV
Heterogeneity -30.48 -50.64 -39.89 -41.72
Randomness -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
EV
Heterogeneity -26.55 -44.88 -36.47 -38.39
Randomness -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Table 2.5 Projected Mean Trips before and after Improvement: Policy 1
2002 2003 2004 2005
Before Improvement
Heterogeneity 9.35 11.04 10.09 10.36
Randomness 0.45 0.29 0.36 0.44
After Improvement
Heterogeneity 12.44 14.04 14.69 13.15
Randomness 0.73 0.46 0.74 0.68
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CHAPTER 3. GREEN CONSUMERISM AND THE
POLLUTION-GROWTH NEXUS
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades, there has been a worldwide surge in awareness of the enormity of
global environmental problems and the role of human activity in creating these problems.
That awareness has produced a kind of environmental consciousness – living in a way so as
to lower one’s negative impact on the environment. This heightened consciousness has been
documented in numerous surveys. For example, the 2009 Cone Consumer Environmental
Survey finds that 35% of Americans report greater interest in the environment compared to
the previous year.1 70% of the Americans surveyed indicate that they are paying attention
to the current activities of companies with regard to the environment. A very similar
picture emerges from the 2008 NHK “Survey of Attitudes Toward the Environment” in
Japan.
The heightened environmental consciousness has translated into concrete action at the
level of individuals. The NHK survey found that more than 50% of Japanese have adopted
relatively easy energy-saving efforts, such as setting air conditioners and heating units at
moderate temperatures, turning off lights when not needed, and bringing their own bags
1The 2009 Cone Consumer Environmental Survey presents the findings of an online survey conducted
January 29-30, 2007 by Opinion Research Corporation among a sample of 1,087 adults comprising 518 men
and 569 women 18 years of age and older. The margin of error associated with a sample of this size is ±3%.
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with them when shopping (eko baggu); 83% took out old newspapers and empty bottles
and cans for goods-recycling or reusable waste collection. When asked what is necessary
to solve environmental problems, 26% answered “effort of individuals”.2 A large number
of Americans too are now environmental ”doers” – in 2007, almost half have purchased
environmentally-friendly products, of whom 62% bought products with recycled content,
56% made energy-efficient home improvements, 24% bought organic or other third-party
certified foods/beverages, and 13% bought energy-efficient cars.3 Despite the economic
downturn, in 2009, 34% of Americans were more likely to buy environmentally responsible
products than they were a year back. Only 14% did not shop with the environment in mind.
I label all such private action aimed at reducing one’s negative impact on the environment
as voluntary environmentalism or green consumerism.4
Green behavior consists of a set of lifestyle choices based on a concern for the envi-
ronment. It manifests itself in activities such as, more energy conservation than is war-
ranted by simple cost savings, broad-based recycling, purchase and use of biodegradable
products, greater use of public transportation and bicycles (in spite of the associated in-
conveniences), purchasing fuel-efficient cars with dubious pecuniary benefits, and so on.
Green consumerism also manifests in patronizing businesses and purchasing products of
companies that are known to be environmentally responsible. Undertaken by enough indi-
2As for the question “How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order
to protect the environment?” as few as 3 percent said “very willing,” while 37 percent said “fairly will-
ing,” 25 percent “fairly unwilling,” and 12 percent “very unwilling.” When asked “How willing would
you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the environment?” only 1 percent said “very willing,”
while 30 percent said “fairly willing,” 27 percent “fairly unwilling,” and 18 percent “very unwilling.”
[http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/english/pdf/090228-07.pdf]
3Back in 2003, Business Week reported on the greening of China: “But, as in much of the rest of the
world, the rise in living standards is also leading to calls among members of the new middle class for greater
attention to the environment. Newspapers are writing about the problem more often, and independent
environmental groups are springing up. As Beijing’s leaders try to balance the needs of development with
the imperative to clean up, it may well be the citizens who lead the way.”
4I use the phrase voluntary environmentalism or mainstream environmentalism to distinguish it from
the more-militant environmental movement. Such environmentalism consists of private lifestyle and con-
sumption choices as distinct from political activism and lobbying that marks the enviromental movement.
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viduals, these activities collectively will likely result in observable differences in the quality
of the environment, but the activities of any one individual are too miniscule to make any
difference to the environment as a whole.
In this paper, I introduce green consumerism into an otherwise-standard, neoclassical
growth model, and use it to study the well-known pollution-growth nexus. Green behavior
is modeled by assuming that all agents derive a warm glow (in the sense of Andreoni,
1990) from their green activities. That is, the fact that people voluntarily incur private
costs intended to increase the supply of a public good such as environmental quality, is
motivated by the private benefit of a warm glow and is unrelated to the actual supply of
the public good. More specifically, I study a two-period overlapping-generations model (a
“Diamond model”) with production where agents receive direct utility from consumption
in each period of life and from their pollution-abatement expenditures made when young.
Agents save for standard life-cycle reasons, and the collective savings of a generation become
the start-of-period capital stock in the following period. The current pollution level is
assumed to depend on its immediate-past level, capital use in the current period, and the
combined pollution-mitigation expenditures made by these green agents. Pollution affects
the lives of agents in that it reduces a scale factor attached to second-period felicity; ceteris
paribus, more pollution reduces the attractiveness of old-age consumption. The assumption
that pollution affects the marginal utility from old-age consumption, i.e., pollution is not
additively-separable from consumption in its impact on utility is of crucial importance in
mapping the impact of pollution on human choices. What is also crucial is that private
agents do not internalize the effect of their green activities on pollution, and in turn, its
effect on their lives.
I go on to characterize optimal green expenditures by agents. I show that in a suffi-
ciently capital-poor economy, agents do not indulge in green consumerism, that is unless
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an economy becomes rich enough, agents do not invest in pollution-abatement expendi-
tures. This result conforms well to popular notions that green lifestyles among people are
more commonly seen in developed countries, and not so much in countries such as India
and China, which nevertheless face dire environmental problems. I also show that capital
rich economies which engage in green consumerism do not necessarily enjoy lower long run
levels of pollution than economies which do not engage in green consumerism.
Next, I consider dynamic, competitive equilibria both in settings where private agents
do and do not make pollution-abatement expenditures. In the former case, the evolution
equation for pollution reduces to a one-dimensional dynamical system, making the analysis
analytically tractable. I can show that, depending on parameter restrictions, the economy
admits either a unique steady state or two steady states. The unique steady state may
be attracting but the path to it involves oscillatory pollution dynamics – periods of high
pollution are followed by those of low pollution. If there are two steady states, the low-
pollution steady state is locally stable, indicating that, once agents in an economy start
to make green expenses, the long-run level of pollution is low. In the case where private
agents do not make pollution-abatement expenditures, the evolution equation for pollution
and capital forms a two-dimensional dynamical system. In this case, I can prove there is
a unique non-trivial steady state. I can show that economies that do not engage in green
consumerism, the dirtier technology as reflected in higher emissions per unit capital, is
associated with higher pollution and lower capital. Further, higher tolerance for pollution
is associated with higher pollution and higher capital. For future use, note a certain self-
destructing nature to pollution: as pollution increases, old-age consumption becomes less
attractive, and this causes agents to smoothen lifecycle consumption by raising young-age
consumption via reduction in saving, which, in turn, helps to reduce future pollution.
I go on to characterize the set of allocations that would be chosen by a benevolent social
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planner. Such a planner would internalize the effect of pollution-mitigation expenses on
pollution, something that the market economy (described above) would not. For standard
reasons, the market economy may or may not accumulate more capital than the planner
would. Here, in addition to that route for inefficiency, it is possible that the market econ-
omy may allocate more or less resources to pollution-abatement. The young consumption
associated with green consumerism in a market economy is higher than the young con-
sumption associated with green consumerism that emerges from the planning solution. I
can show that, given the level of development of the economy, the planner may choose not
to allocate any resources to pollution-abatement. I can further show that in the planning
solution young and old consumption as well as capital are higher when mitigation is posi-
tive as compared with the situation where it is zero. However, pollution will not necessarily
be lower in presence of mitigation than in absence of it.
Using numerical methods, I proceed to compare long-run levels of various variables of
interest across the market and planned economies. The upshot of this comparison is this.
Relative to the competitive outcome, the planner allocates less to both young and old-
age consumption, but uses these freed-up resources to finance more pollution-mitigation
expenses. The result is lower pollution and lower capital than what the market would have
chosen.
My analysis departs from previous work in this area in several ways. First, many
models (such as, in the seminal piece by John and Pecchenino, 1994, and many others
in that line), studying the pollution-growth nexus incorporate environmental quality as
an argument of utility, and allow private agents to influence it either directly via their
own pollution-mitigation investments or indirectly by a government via tax collections. In
contrast, I explicitly model the idea that actions taken by an atomistic private agent could
not possibly influence the overall quality of the environment. These studies implicitly
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assume that the quality of the environment does not impact the marginal utility from
consumption of non-environmental goods. This additive-separability of the environment
and consumption buys them tractability but is restrictive in that the impact of human
choices on the environment is studied but the reverse, the impact of the environmental
on human behavior, is ignored. My paper is part of a short, recent line of work that
incorporate the bi-directional link between individual choices and pollution. In Jouvet et
al. (2007), Varvarigos (2008), and Mariani et al. (2010), pollution reduces longevity, and
hence saving (which, in turn, affects pollution via production); however, the strength of
the empirical link – see Bloom et al. (2003), for example – between longevity and saving
is not very strong. My formulation avoids this potential pitfall. Finally, to the best of my
knowledge, the current paper is the first to study the new and evolving phenomenon of
green consumerism and its connection to the pollution-growth nexus.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and examines
the competitive equilibrium, section 3 details the benchmark planning problem, and Section
4 discusses some comparative static results comparing the competitive equilibrium with the
planning solutions in the long run. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 The model
Consider an economy populated by an infinite sequence of two-period lived overlapping
generations and an initial old generation. At each date, t = 1, 2, 3..., a new generation
is born; each consists of a continuum of agents with mass 1. Each agent, starting with
Generation 1, has one unit of time when young and retires when old.
The sole final good of the economy is produced using a production function F (Kt, Lt),
where Kt denotes the capital input and Lt denotes the labor input at t. Let kt ≡ Kt/Lt
denote the capital-labor ratio (capital per young agent). Output per young agent at time
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t may be expressed as yt = f(kt); f(kt) ≡ F (Kt/Lt, 1) is the intensive form. For most
of what I do below, I assume f (k) = Akθ, θ ∈ (0, 1) . The final good is either consumed
in the period it is produced or it can be stored to yield capital the following period. For
analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate entirely between periods.
Let c1t (c2t+1) denote the consumption of the final good at date t (date t + 1) by
a representative young (old) agent born at t. Let mt denote the pollution-mitigating
expenditures at date t by a young agent. All such agents have preferences representable
by the time-separable utility function
U(c1t, c2t+1,mt) ≡ ln (c1t) + ϕ ln (c2t+1) + γmt; γ > 0
where ϕ is a factor that scales old-age felicity. Agents take ϕ as given. In actuality, ϕ is
assumed to depend on the level of pollution in the economy; specifically,
ϕ ≡ ϕ (Pt) = β
(
1− Pt
Pˆ
)
where Pt is pollution at date t. The parameter Pˆ provides an upper bound on the pollution
tolerable. Intuitively, it stands for that level of pollution at which agents attach zero
weight on second period consumption and do not save for the future. In that sense it is
the maximum tolerable pollution. The parameter β is positive. For future reference note,
in my overlapping-generations setup, it is strictly speaking, not necessary to have ϕ ≤ 1.
Intuitively, ϕ can be thought of as a scaling factor that weighs utility from second
period consumption relative to that from first period consumption. In recent studies that
examine the impact of pollution on longevity, ϕ is the probability of the agent surviving to
old age (Jouvet et al., 2007; Varvarigos, 2008; and Mariani et al. 2010).5 In other studies
examining health expenditure in the context of growth models this has been interpreted
5Exposure to fine particulate matter in air has long been associated with increased morbidity and mor-
tality. For instance, particulate matter (PM) air pollution has been known to increase risks of cardiovascular
incidents. Even short-term exposure to PM2.5 over a few hours can trigger myocardial infarctions, cardiac
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as the fraction of the second period that the agent is alive (Bhattacharya and Xiao, 2005).
In its present formulation, ϕ could be analogous to quality-adjusted life years, indicating
that young-age exposure to pollution reduces the ability to enjoy consumption in old age.
Alternatively, absence of pollution or cleanliness of the environment may be thought of as
complementary to old age consumption.
It deserves mention that utility is assumed to be linear in mitigation. This is a deliberate
choice and serves two purposes. First, it permits corner solutions in mitigation expenses.
This is important in the present context because green consumerism, as yet, is observed
primarily in the developed world. Second, linearity of utility in mitigation greatly enhances
the analytical tractability of the model. The thrust of our results will not change if this
linearity is abandoned.
Since young agents do not value leisure, they supply their unit labor endowments
inelastically in competitive labor markets, earning a wage of wt at time t, where
wt ≡ w(kt) = f(kt)− ktf ′(kt) = (1− θ)Akθt
and w′(kt) > 0. In addition, capital is traded in competitive capital markets, and earns a
gross real return of Rt+1 between t and t+ 1, where
Rt+1 ≡ R (kt+1) = f ′(kt+1) = θAkθ−1t+1
with R′ (kt+1) < 0.
ischemia, arrhythmias, heart failure, stroke, exacerbation of peripheral arterial disease, and sudden death.
Chronic exposure to moderately elevated levels also enhances the risk for developing a variety of cardio-
vascular diseases, possibly including hypertension and systemic atherosclerosis (Brook, 2007) On the other
side of the coin is the documented improvement in longevity on account on improvements in air quality.
In a study of 211 county units in the 51 U.S. metropolitan areas for two periods between late 1970s and
early 1980s and the late 1990s and early 2000s, Pope et al. (2009) found that a decrease of 10 µg per cubic
meter in the concentration of fine particulate matter was associated with an estimated increase in mean
life expectancy of 0.61 years after adjusting for changes in socioeconomic and demographic variables and
in proxy indicators for the prevalence of cigarette smoking. The study concluded that reductions in air
pollution accounted for 15% of overall increases in life expectancy in the study areas. It is important to
note that the impact of air and water pollution goes beyond mortality rates.
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Finally, it remains to describe the process of evolution for polluion. Pollution in period
t is given by
Pt = (1− α)Pt−1 + bkt − νmt (1)
where α < 1 is the fraction of pollutants that is naturally absorbed by the biosphere in
one period. Thus (1− α)Pt−1 is the pollution from period t − 1 that persists into period
t. New emissions from production (capital use k) add to the pollution and mitigation (m)
activities neutralize some of the emissions and persisting pollution.
The representative agent’s budget constraints are given by
wt = c1t + st +mt
c2t+1 = Rt+1st
where s denotes saving. Wage income is allocated to consumption, savings and potentially
to mitigation investment. Savings are loaned out to firms who use them as capital for
production. Wages are paid at the beginning of each period. Interest on capital is paid at
the end of each period. At the end of each period, young agents retire and receive their
interest earnings which they consume fully as old agents in the next period.
3.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium
Atomistic agents take the environment as given and do not internalize the impact of
their consumption or mitigation decisions on the environment. As a result they take the
discount factor ϕ as given. Similar to the standard Diamond model, agents also take
the market interest rate as given. The first-order conditions of the representative agent’s
problem are given by
1
c1t
= ϕ
1
st
≥ γ.
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where γ is the constant marginal utility of mitigation expenditure. The standard Kuhn-
Tucker necessary conditions require that mt = 0 as long as the marginal utility of young
(and old) consumption exceeds γ, the constant marginal utility of mitigation and mt > 0
when the marginal utility of young consumption equals γ.
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence {c1t, c2t+1,mt, st, kt+1, Pt}∞t=0 such that the
agents’ first order conditions are satisfied, the goods market and the capital market both
clear, and pollution evolves according to (1). In equilibrium st = kt+1 so that the agent’s
first order conditions imply
kt+1
1
ϕ (Pt)
= c1t ≤ 1
γ
This condition will hold with equality when mitigation is positive. This tells us that an
economy will engage in mitigation expenditure only when it is rich enough in the sense that
its savings and young age consumption are high enough. The economy will not mitigate
till its consumption equals 1γ . Since ϕ
′ (Pt) < 0, it may be tempting to suggest that an
economy will engage in mitigation expenditure only when its pollution level is high enough.
But this line of argument may be inaccurate since current mitigation also affects current
pollution as given by (1) and the two variables are simultaneously determined. It is useful
to look at the competitive equilibrium in terms of two regimes. viz. when mitigation is
positive and when it is at zero. As can be anticipated from here, the path of the economy
where mitigation expenditure is zero will be determined by a different set of conditions
from the path of an economy where mitigation expenditure is positive. In other words, a
poor economy’s dynamics will be different from those of a rich economy. This means that
in terms of the dynamics of an economy the transition from poverty to prosperity will not
be smooth.
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3.2.1.1 Mitigation Expenditure is zero
In an economy that is not rich enough for green consumerism to have started, the
competitive equilibrium is determined by
kt+1
1
ϕ (Pt)
= c1t
Market clearing requires that
w (kt) = c1t + kt+1
which translates into
A (1− θ) kθt =
(
1 +
1
ϕ (Pt)
)
kt+1 (2)
The law of motion for pollution is given by
Pt = (1− α)Pt−1 + bkt (3)
Equations (2) and (3) together define the dynamics of the economy over time. This is a two
dimensional system so that the standard analysis of the time paths will not be possible.
Steady states for the economy are given by
A (1− θ) kθ =
(
1 +
1
ϕ (P )
)
k
αP = bk
Proposition 1 The economy admits two steady states, a trivial one where k and P both
equal zero, and another positive steady state.
Proof. The two equations above can be collapsed into one to give
A (1− θ) kθ =
(
1 +
1
ϕ
(
b
αk
)) k
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This obviously has a solution at k = 0 since ϕ
(
b
α0
)
= β. Consider the case where
k 6= 0. Then we have
A (1− θ) kθ−1 =
(
1 +
1
ϕ
(
b
αk
)) (4)
LHS = A (1− θ) kθ−1 is decreasing and concave in k. RHS = 1 + 1
β
(
1− b
hPˆ
k
) is increasing
and convex in k. Therefore, there can be at most one intersection between the two, implying
that there can be only one steady state solution at which both k and P are positive. Such
an intersection will exist only if limk→0 LHS < limk→0RHS.
lim
k→0
LHS = lim
k→0
A (1− θ) kθ−1 =∞
lim
k→0
RHS = 1 + lim
k→0
1
β
(
1− b
αPˆ
k
) = 1 + 1
β
<∞
This implies that there does exist an intersection between the LHS and the RHS. Let
the positive steady state equilibrium defined by this intersection be given by k0, and let
the corresponding level of pollution be given by P 0.
Lemma 1 There is an upper bound on the unique positive steady state level of pollution
of an economy which does not engage in green consumerism. It is given by P 0 ≤ β
αγ
b +
β
Pˆ
. The corresponding upper bound on capital is given by k0 ≤ αb
β
αγ
b +
β
Pˆ
Proof. See Appendix 1
At this positive steady state we can examine the comparative static results with respect
to some of the parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 In the positive steady state of an economy that does not does not mitigate
dk
dPˆ
> 0, dkdb < 0,
dP
dPˆ
> 0, and dPdb > 0
Proof. See Appendix 2
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A higher tolerance for pollution as manifested in a high value of Pˆ translates into a
higher value of the discount factor for second period consumption. This makes old age
consumption more valuable and hence encourages savings which in turn implies higher
levels of capital so that dk
dPˆ
> 0. Higher levels of savings (capital) correspond with higher
levels of pollution in absence of mitigation implying dP
dPˆ
> 0. The parameter b is the
amount of emissions per unit capital used for production. A dirtier technology manifesting
in a high value of b implies higher levels of pollution, which through the discount factor
lowers attractiveness of old age consumption and hence savings (capital). This indicates
that technology transfer to less developed economies for lowering emissions per unit capital
use are useful for lowering their long run pollution levels.
3.2.1.2 Mitigation Expenditure is Positive
When the economy is engaging in green consumerism, meaning mt > 0 holds, its com-
petitive equilibrium is defined by kt+1 =
ϕ(Pt)
γ or kt =
ϕ(Pt−1)
γ and c1t =
1
γ . This is the
primary benefit of assuming quasi-linearity; the marginal utility of young-age consump-
tion is a constant, and hence, young-age consumption is fixed. Using the agent’s budget
constraint, it follows that
w (kt) =
1
γ
+
ϕ (Pt)
γ
+mt such that
mt = w
(
ϕ (Pt−1)
γ
)
− 1
γ
− ϕ (Pt)
γ
Substituting this into the law of motion for pollution, I get
Pt = (1− α)Pt−1 + bϕ (Pt−1)
γ
− ν
[
w
(
ϕ (Pt−1)
γ
)
− 1
γ
− ϕ (Pt)
γ
]
The constant marginal utility of mitigation allows us to capture the dynamics of the econ-
omy in a single equation in lagged values of Pt. Expanding ϕ (Pt) into its specified func-
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tional form we can express Pt as a function of Pt−1 and the parameters of the model
as
Pt =
(1− α)Pt−1 + bϕ(Pt−1)γ − νw
(
ϕ(Pt−1)
γ
)
+ ν(1+β)γ(
1 + νβ
Pˆγ
) (5)
As discussed earlier, Pˆ is the maximum tolerable pollution, beyond which the atomistic
agent has no incentive to save for old age. This is an extreme situation and it is useful to
focus on the conditions under which agents do save for old age. So far, there is nothing
that prevents pollution in period t from exceeding Pˆ . As it happens, we need to impose
some restrictions on parameters of the model to ensure that pollution in any period does
not exceed Pˆ .
Lemma 2 νγ ≤ αPˆ is necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that Pt never exceeds Pˆ
Proof. See Appendix 3
Call this condition C1.
ν
γ
≤ αPˆ (C1)
Differentiating with respect to Pt−1 we get
dPt
dPt−1
=
(1− α)− β
Pˆγ
[
b− νAθ (1− θ)
((
1− Pt−1
Pˆ
)
β
γ
)θ−1]
(
1 + νβ
Pˆγ
) and
d2Pt
dP 2t−1
=
νAθ (1− θ)2
((
Pˆ − Pt−1
))θ−2 (
1
Pˆ
β
γ
)θ(
1 + 1
Pˆ
βg
γ
) > 0
The slope dPtdPt−1 is increasing in Pt−1. This slope could be positive throughout or negative
initially and then bottom out before becoming positive. A priori, we cannot say which
of these would materialize for an economy but we can impose certain necessary and/or
conditions on the parameters associated with each scenario.
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Lemma 3 (i) 1−α− b
Pˆ
β
γ +νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1
1
Pˆ
> 0 is sufficient to ensure that dPtdPt−1 > 0
always. (ii) 1−α− b
Pˆ
β
γ + νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1
1
Pˆ
< 0 is a necessary condition for dPtdPt−1 < 0
at least for a stretch.
Proof. (i) Since dPtdPt−1 is increasing in Pt−1,
dPt
dPt−1 is at its lowest when Pt−1 = 0. Hence,
if dPtdPt−1 ≥ 0 when Pt−1 = 0, it must be positive for all Pt−1 > 0. When Pt−1 = 0,
dPt
dPt−1
=
1− α− β
Pˆγ
[
b− νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1]
(
1 + νβ
Pˆγ
)
Hence 1 − α − β
Pˆγ
[
b− νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1] ≥ 0 implies and is implied by dPtdPt−1 ≥ 0 at
Pt−1 = 0. (ii) Since 1 − α − βPˆγ
[
b− νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1] ≥ 0 is a sufficient condition for
dPt
dPt−1 to be positive always, its violation is a necessary condition to ensure that
dPt
dPt−1 < 0
at least for a stretch.
Note, if 1 − α − b
Pˆ
β
γ + νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1
1
Pˆ
< 0 then dPtdPt−1 < 0 for very small values
of Pt−1 and dPtdPt−1 > 0 for larger values of Pt−1.
d2Pt
dP 2t−1
> 0 implies that the slope of the path of pollution is continually rising and if Pt
is initially falling in Pt−1, it will eventually bottom out and then rise with Pt−1. In other
words, if there is a stationary point on this path, it is a minimum. We call this necessary
condition C2.
1− α− b
Pˆ
β
γ
+ νAθ (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ−1 1
Pˆ
< 0 (C2)
The steady states for this economy are given by
αP +
b+ ν
γ
β
P
Pˆ
= −νw
(
β
γ
(
1− P
Pˆ
))
+
ν
γ
+
b+ ν
γ
β
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Proposition 3 If condition C1 holds, then νγ +
b+ν
γ β − νA (1− θ)
(
β
γ
)θ
< 0 is necessary
and sufficient to ensure that there exists a unique steady state for this economy when
mitigation is positive.
Proof. See Appendix 4
Figure 3.1 Law of Motion with a unique positive steady state
Let A = 12, θ = 0.39, γ = 0.2, β = 1, α = 0.1, b = 2.9, ν = 2, and Pˆ = 10. Figure
1 illustrates the relation between Pt and Pt−1 under these parameter restrictions so that
condition C2 is satisfied. As can be seen from the figure, dPtdPt−1 is negative initially and then
becomes positive. This is an instance when the path of pollution cuts the 45 degree line
70
from above. An economy approaching this steady state will display cycles with periods of
low pollution alternating with periods of high pollution. The steady state shown in figure
1 is stable if the slope of the path of pollution is less than one in absolute value at the
steady state. Slope of the path of pollution at a steady state is given by
∣∣∣∣ dPtdPt−1
∣∣∣∣ = α+ bPˆ βγ − 1− νAθ (1− θ)
((
1− P
Pˆ
)
β
γ
)θ−1
1
Pˆ
β
γ(
1 + βν
Pˆγ
)
The denominator is greater than one and so a necessary condition for the absolute value
of this derivative to be positive is that α + b
Pˆ
β
γ > 1 +
βν
Pˆγ
or b > ν + (1− α) Pˆ γβ . If this
condition does not hold, it implies that
∣∣∣ dPtdPt−1 ∣∣∣ < 1 and the steady state is stable. Thus a
sufficient condition for the steady state to be stable is
b > ν + (1− α) Pˆ γ
β
(C3)
b is the emission per unit capital usage in production. ν is the pollution abated per unit
expenditure on mitigation. Hence, for the steady state to be unstable, the abatement
potential of mitigation investment has to be less than the emission potential for new pro-
duction. In other words, mitigation has to be inefficient. For an economy on this path, the
cycles will eventually die down and converge to the steady state. However, in the transition
period it will periodically seem to regress on its path to lower pollution. The possibility
of a steady state like this indicates that just because an economy is mitigating does not
mean it will be on a path of monotonically declining pollution.
Another possible time path of pollution could arise when condition C2 does not hold.
Let A = 15, θ = 0.4, γ = 0.3, β = 1.5, α = 0.1, b = 5, ν = 1, and Pˆ = 11. Figure 2
illustrates the relation between Pt and Pt−1 under these parameter restrictions. In this
instance, the slope of the curve is positive throughout. There are two steady states
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Figure 3.2 Law of Motion with two positive steady states
In this case the lower steady state is stable while the higher one is not. It indicates
that when an economy is engaging in green consumerism, it will not converge to a high
pollution steady state in the long run. Convergence to the low pollution steady state will
be monotonic.
From the first order conditions of the market economy we surmised that the economy
will have a higher level of young consumption when mitigation expenditure is positive
than when it is not mitigating. We can take the comparison between the two regimes in a
market economy further. Let us denote the unique positive steady state when mitigation
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expenditure is positive by (k∗, P ∗). As before, the unique positive steady state when the
mitigation expenditure is zero is given by
(
k0, P 0
)
.
Proposition 4 k∗ ≥ k0; P ∗ T P 0
Proof. See Appendix 5 This tells us that an economy will start engaging in green
consumerism only when it is sufficiently capital rich. However, just because it is engaging
in green consumerism does not mean that an economy will have lower levels of pollution
than the time when it was capital poor but was not engaging in green consumerism. This
is because the higher levels capital result in higher emissions which may or may not be
entirely neutralized by the green consumerism. Total pollution in the mt > 0 is lower as
compared to the mt = 0 regime if the pollution abatement on account of green consumerism
more than neutralizes the entire additional emissions on account of the higher capital.
It is useful to study the steady states of this economy in comparison with the first best.
The planner’s problem provides the first best steady states. As stated earlier, atomistic
agents do not internalize the impact of their savings decisions either on the interest rate or
on the level of pollution. Similarly, atomistic agents do not internalize the impact of their
green consumerism on the level of pollution and they take the scale factor φ as given. It is
interesting to see what happens in the planner’s where these three factors are internalized
in making the consumption, savings and mitigation decisions.
3.3 Planner’s Problem
The planner maximizes the discounted sum of the utilities of all current and future
generations subject to a resource constraint and the law of motion for pollution. The
Lagrangian function for the planner is given by
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L = u0+
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
ln (c1t) + β
(
1− Pt
Pˆ
)
ln (c2t+1) + γmt + λt
[
Akθt − c1t − c2t − kt+1 −mt
]
+ µt [Pt − (1− α)Pt−1 − bkt + νmt]
]
where δ is the intergenerational discount rate. λt and µt are Lagrange multipliers.
Note, −µt is the marginal disutility of emissions so that µt is positive. The first order
conditions for the planner are given by
1
c1t
− λt = 0
β
(
1− Pt−1
Pˆ
)
1
c2t
− δλt = 0
γ − λt + µtν ≤ 0
δλt+1Aθk
θ−1
t+1 − λt − δµt+1b = 0
− β
Pˆ
ln (c2t+1) + µt − (1− α) δµt+1 = 0
Akθt − c1t − c2t − kt+1 −mt = 0
Pt − (1− α)Pt−1 − bkt + νmt = 0
The planner internalizes four different factors which the atomistic agent does not. First,
the planner recognizes impact of pollution on the discount factor for old age consumption.
Second, the planner recognizes that pollution is persistant and higher pollution in any one
period translates into higher residual pollution in the next period. Third, she recognizes
the impact of capital accumulation on pollution. For this reason, the planner perceives a
lower marginal utility of savings than the market does. Fourth, the planner internalizes the
impact of mitigation on the level of pollution. This is reflected in the first order condition
with respect to mitigation. For the market, the marginal utility of mitigation is given by
γ, reflecting only the warm-glow on account of green consumerism. For the planner, the
marginal utility of mitigation expenditure equals γ + µtν.
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In the steady state the planner’s first order conditions are given by
1
c1
− λ = 0
γ − λ+ µν ≤ 0
δλAθkθ−1 − λ− δµb = 0
−β
(
1
Pˆ
)
ln (c2) + µ− (1− α) δµ = 0
Akθ − c1 − c2 − k −m = 0
αP − bk + νm = 0
Several things stand out. First, that we can put a lower bound on old age consumption
and an upper bound on capital in the first best solution.
The first order condition with respect to pollution in the planner’s problem implies
[1− (1− α) δ]µ = β
Pˆ
ln (c2)
Note, negative µ is the shadow price of net emissions or the marginal utility of net emissions.
Typically we would expect µ to be positive. If µ is always positive, it implies that ln (c2)
is positive or c2 > 1.
From the first order condition with respect to capital we have
(
δAθkθ−1 − 1
)
λ = δbµ
where λ, the shadow price of capital, is positive. This implies that δAθkθ−1 − 1 is positive
meaning k < (δAθ)
1
1−θ
Like the competitive equilibrium, the planner’s problem too needs to be studied under
two regimes, one where there is no mitigation going on and another where the mitigation
expenditure is positive.
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3.3.1 When mitigation is zero
As long as c1t ≤ 1γ+µtν , the planner will not allocate resources to mitigation investment.
The steady state for the planner when mitigation expenditure is zero is described by the
following equations.
c2 =
β
δ
(
1− P
Pˆ
)
c1
Akθt − k =
(
1 +
β
δ
(
1− P
Pˆ
))
c1
αP = bk
µ =
(
δAθkθ−1 − 1
) 1 + βδ (1− bkαPˆ )(
Akθt − k
)
δb
[1− (1− α) δ]µ = β
Pˆ
ln (c2)
Together they can be written as a single equation in k as
[1− (1− α) δ]
(
δAθkθ−1 − 1
) 1 + βδ (1− bkαPˆ )(
Akθt − k
)
δb
=
β
Pˆ
ln
β
δ
(
1− bk
αPˆ
)
Akθt − k(
1 + βδ
(
1− bk
αPˆ
))

3.3.2 Mitigation is positive
The planner allocates resources to mitigation investment as soon as young consumption
equals 1γ+µtν . A market economy, will not engage in green consumerism unless young age
consumption equals 1γ . In other words, the first best solution would require mitigation
expenditure to start at lower levels of young age consumption than the levels at which
market economy starts mitigating. In this regime, the planner’s steady state equilibrium
is given by
c2 =
β
δ
(
1− P
Pˆ
)
c1
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1
c1
− λ = 0
γ − λ+ µν = 0
δλAθkθ−1 − λ− δµb = 0
−β
(
1
Pˆ
)
ln (c2) + µ− (1− α) δµ = 0
Akθ − c1 − c2 − k −m = 0
αP − bk + νm = 0
Rearranging these conditions, we can define the steady state in terms of three equations
in the variables c1, k and P .
c1 =
1
γ
−
[
δAθkθ−1 − 1
] ν
δbγ
Akθ − k −
(
1 +
β
δ
(
1− P
Pˆ
))
c1 =
b
ν
k − α
ν
P
β
Pˆ
ln
(
β
δ
(
1− P
Pˆ
)
c1
)
c1 =
(
δAθkθ−1 − 1)
δb
[1− (1− α) δ]
This can be further reduced to two equations in k and P after substituting out c1.
As in the case for the market economy, the planning solution too admits a higher young
consumption under the positive mitigation regime than under the zero mitigation regime.
This derives directly from the first order conditions with respect to young consumption
and mitigation which imply that c1 ≤ 1γ+µν when resources are not allocated to mitigation
and c1 = 1γ+µν when resources are allocated to mitigation expenditure. Further, the steady
state capital in the presence of mitigation expenditure exceeds steady state capital in the
no-mitigation regime. Consider a case where there is a unique, non-trivial steady state in
77
each of the two regimes. Let
{
c01, c
0
2, k
0, P 0
}
indicate the steady state levels of young-age
consumption, old-age consumption, capital and pollution in the no-mitigation regime and
let {c∗1, c∗2, k∗, P ∗} indicate the corresponding steady state levels in the positive mitigation
regime. As discussed before c∗1 ≥ c01. Further, let µ0 and µ∗ be the steady state levels of µ
in the two regimes.
Proposition 5 c∗2 ≥ c02, k∗ > k0, P ∗ T P 0
Proof. From the first order conditions for young consumption and mitigation we have
µ0 ≤ γ − 1
c01
µ∗ = γ − 1
c∗1
c∗1 ≥ c01 implies that µ∗ ≥ µ0. From the first order conditions for pollution we have
[1− (1− α) δ]µ = β
Pˆ
ln (c2)
so that
β
Pˆ
ln (c∗2) ≥
β
Pˆ
ln
(
c02
)
which in turn implies that c∗2 ≥ c02. The resource constraints in the two regimes can be
written as
f
(
k0
)− k0 = c01 + c02
f (k∗)− k∗ = c∗1 + c∗2 +m∗
This, together with c∗1 ≥ c01 and c∗2 ≥ c02 implies that f (k∗) − k∗ > f
(
k0
) − k0. By
Lemma 3, f ′ (k) > 1. This is true for capital in both regimes. Hence f (k∗)−k∗ > f (k0)−k0
implies that k∗ > k0. k∗ > k0 means that emissions in under positive mitigation are higher.
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But the higher emissions will be neutralized to some extent by positive mitigation. In the
end
P ∗ =
b
α
k∗ − ν
α
m∗ T b
α
k0 = P 0
Comparing the planner’s solution with that of the market we find that the planner
starts allocating resources to mitigation at a lower level of young age consumption than the
market. From the first order conditions with respect to young consumption and mitigation
of the we have, c1p ≤ 1γ+µpν < 1γ = c1mk, where the subscript p stands for the planner
and the subscript mk stands for the market economy. This implies that the planner’s
level of young consumption is associated with positive mitigation is lower than the young
consumption in a market economy at which mitigation begins.
3.4 Comparative Statics
The steady states of the planner and the market cannot be compared analytically but
we can examine the comparative statics of the two numerically. The purpose of this is to
examine the responses of the market economy relative to the first best responses, when a
parameter of the models is changing. In other words, it allows us to examine the long run
equilibria of the market economy relative to the first best for a continuum of changes in
the values of one parameter, holding other parameters unchanged. As a first instance, it
might be useful to look at the comparative statics with respect to the maximum tolerable
pollution or Pˆ . To examine the comparative statics for the competitive equilibrium and
the planning solution with respect to Pˆ To to this, we set the parameters of the model
as follows A = 8.5, θ = 0.3, γ = 0.2, β = 1, α = 0.5, b = 3.5, ν = 2, and δ = 0.9999.
The parameter of interest, Pˆ ranged betwee 21 and 30. Figure 3 presents the comparative
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static results for the planner and the market economy with respect to Pˆ .
Figure 3.3 Comparative Statics of the Planner and Market with respect to
Pˆ*
*The planning solutions are indicated in red and the competitive equilibria in blue
The red lines represents the planner’s comparative statics and the blue lines do the
same for the competitive equilibrium.
As figure 3 indicates, the planner delivers a higher utility with lower consumption than
the market in both young and old age. The higher utility in the planner’s solution comes
from two sources, viz., the higher discount factor for old age consumption and higher levels
of warm-glow satisfaction on account of greater mitigation expenditure. In the standard
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Diamond model the only source of inefficiency arises from the the failure of atomistic agents
to internalize the effect of their savings on the prevailing interest rate in the economy. In
the steady state of the standard model we have
u′
(
cM1
)
= ρRu′
(
cM2
)
u′
(
cP1
)
= ρf ′
(
kP
)
u′
(
cP2
)
where the superscripts M and P stand for the market and the planner, respectively,
ρ stands for the discount factor for old age consumption, R represents the market rate of
interest, and c1 and c2 stand for young and old consumption, respectively. The market
solution is different from the planner’s when R 6= f ′ (kP ). In my model, in addition to this,
we have two more sources of inefficiency, the first of which relates to capital accumulation.
u′
(
cM1
)
= ϕRu′
(
cM2
)
u′
(
cP1
)
= ϕ
(
PP
)
f ′
(
kP
)
u′
(
cP2
)
where PP is the planner’s steady state pollution. Now, in addition to the rate of return on
capital, the planner’s discount factor might be different from the markets. This discount
factor depends on pollutions levels which in turn depend partly on the level of capital.
Thus from the planner’s perspective, the market is overaccumulating capital. The second
factor which affects this discount factor is the level of mitigation. To isolate the effect of
mitigation on the differences between the planner’s and the market’s solutions, we conduct
a thought experiment. We ask what happens when we force the level of capital to be the
same for the market and the planner and allow the other variables to adjust optimally. To
do this we take the optimal levels of capital in the market and set the planner’s capital to
equal the market’s capital for different values of Pˆ . Figure 4 represents the comparative
statics for the planner and the market under these conditions. Note, the parameter values
are identical to the ones used for generating figure 3.
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With capital and hence the output equalized between the planning and competitive
equilibria, the only source of suboptimality in the market solution comes from allocation
of that output to consumption and mitigation. Here again, we find that the planner
allocates greater resources to mitigation at the cost of young and old consumption. The
differences in the discount factor in this case reflect differences in pollution solely on account
of differences in mitigation. Internalizing the impact of lower pollution on marginal utility
of old consumption through the discount factor causes the planner to mitigate much more
than the market even when the output is the same for both.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper sought to study the role of environment as public good in an overlapping
generation growth model. The main body of the literature in this area has focused on the
effect of human activity on the environment through the emission of pollutants. Additive
separability of pollution and consumption in these models ensures that levels of pollution
do not affect human choices. This paper added to the small but growing line of studies
that seek to study the impact of long-term pollution on human choices, by relaxing the
assumption of additive separability of pollution and consumption in the utility function.
A second contribution of this paper has been to incorporate green lifestyle choices and
corporate environmentalism as a driver of pollution abatement. This is the first such
attempt to model a growing trend in developed economies in the western world that is
catching on in the fast growing economies like India and China as well. Using green
choices as the primary driver of pollution abatement is an improvement on the standard
literature because it gets around the problematic assumption that earlier studies make
whereby mitigation investment is either decided by a central authority or by agents in a
provision of a public good game.
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As expected, I find that an economy starts to expend on mitigation of the environment
only when it is rich enough in terms of having high enough capital and consumption.
Among economies that are not abating pollution, capital and pollution are both higher for
the economies with higher tolerance for pollution. But in such economies capital stock is
smaller for those with dirtier industries, i.e. having greater emissions per unit capital used
for production. Pollution is also higher for these economies. This supports the traditional
view that transfer of cleaner technology to these economies will bring down pollution in the
long run. Multiple steady states are possible for economies that mitigate the environment.
In particular some of these steady states may involve cyclical fluctuations in pollution.
Thus even though an economy is investing in the abatement of pollution, it may experience
alternating periods of high and low pollution. Unless mitigation is sufficiently inefficient,
this economy will eventually converge to the steady state. In case of multiple steady states,
the one with the lower pollution is stable while the one with the higher pollution is not. This
implies that when an economy is engaging in pollution abatement, it will not converge to a
long run equilibrium with high pollution levels. Comparing with the benchmark planner’s
solution we find that because atomistic agents do not internalize the polluting impact of
their savings decisions, the market will overaccumulate capital and usually under-mitigate
the environment in the long run.
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Figure 3.4 Comparative Statics of the Planner and Market with respect to
Pˆ*: Planner’s Capital Equals the Market’s
*The planning solutions are indicated in red and the competitive equilibria in blue
